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Small Town Justice in the Twenty-First Century: 











This thesis provides a primer on mayor’s courts in Ohio, assesses common claims about the 
problems they create and the benefits they provide, and recommends reforms to improve 
mayor’s courts throughout the state. These local courts suffer from two primary problems: 
money’s perverse and pervasive influence and a lack of of transparency and oversight that 
makes identifying misbehavior difficult. But they also have the potential to provide a more 
personal, flexible adjudication process. Mayor’s courts are also much closer to the communities 
they serve than alternative courts would be; that fact is proven by geospatial analysis that, for 
the first time, estimates the actual extent of mayor’s courts’ proximity advantage. Instead of 
abandoning a system with so much potential, the Ohio General Assembly should 1) divorce 
fundraising and justice, 2) raise education requirements for presiding mayors, 3) standardize 
record-keeping, 4) increase transparency, and 5) bolster oversight to ensure that mayor’s courts 






Mayor’s courts are a special type of local court that gives broad discretion to local political 
actors. Run by the community’s mayor—who need not be an attorney or even have a high 
school degree—or the mayor’s designee, these courts are designed to dispense convenient, 
personal justice for low-level offenses.  While mayor’s courts were once common, only 
1
Louisiana and Ohio still use them. Despite dwindling popularity across the country, business is 
booming for Ohio’s mayor’s courts; the 295 mayor’s courts across the state processed more 
than 263,000 cases in 2017.  
2
Unlike most courts, mayor’s courts are subject to negligible oversight, have minimal training 
requirements for those running the court, and are not even part of the judicial branch. As these 
hyper-local courts process hundreds of thousands of cases, they generate enormous sums of 
money for the community governments that run them. Along the way, certain mayor’s courts 
have become notoriously unfair while others are more convenient and provide greater 
procedural justice than many non-mayor’s courts. 
The stakes are high. While mayor’s courts only have jurisdiction over relatively minor cases, 
even cases for picayune offenses can have outsized effects for those involved.  The severe 3
problems with certain mayor’s courts and the danger of money’s influence in the system at large 
undermine justice and ruin lives. 
Ohio mayor’s courts have been the subject of legislative debate and academic analysis since 
their early days. Recently, mayor’s court debates have gained renewed traction in popular 
discourse too. This heightened focus on mayor’s courts locally coupled with the growing 
awareness about the harm done by small claims courts nationally may ultimately fuel 
much-needed change in the way mayor’s courts are governed. Informed reforms, rather than 
reactionary bans, are necessary to optimize the system. 
Current debates about mayor’s courts, however, suffer from a dearth of nuanced information. 
They instead turn on generalizations—alleged problems and benefits backed by, at best, flimsy 
support. This paper evaluates those oft-repeated and rarely tested claims, exploring what risks 
mayor’s courts carry and what benefits they actually provide. 
The paper also challenges the misleadingly monolithic portrayal of mayor's courts commonly 
deployed by other reviews.  Inferring uniformity among mayor’s courts where none exists tricks 4
critics and supporters into using the behavior of certain courts to condemn or endorse all 
mayor’s courts. No mayor’s court is representative. 
1 Sri Thakkilapati,“What is a Mayor’s Court,” ​Commentary ​(blog), ​ACLU Ohio, ​February 22, 2018, 
https://www.acluohio.org/archives/blog-posts/what-is-a-mayors-court. 
2 The most recent summary data offered by the Ohio Supreme Court is from 2017. See The Supreme Court of Ohio, 
Court Services Division, ​Mayor’s Courts Summary​, 2017, 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/mayorscourt/mayorscourtreport17.pdf 
3 Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic Books, 2018). 




By design, each court enjoys significant discretion to operate as community leaders see fit, so 
long as it stays within the broad constraints set by Ohio law. Rather than being fundamentally 
similar like municipal and county courts are, mayor’s courts are independent and unique. 
Problems and benefits in a given mayor’s court are primarily the result of either structural factors 
or discretionary decisions. Structural factors are created by the rules that govern all mayor’s 
courts. For example, complaints about the mayor’s unilateral authority to choose whether or not 
to operate a court would apply to all mayor’s courts. Similarly, elements that are common to all 
mayor’s courts can be said to be an inherent part of the form—the ability for communities to 
collect fines and fees, using a court to generate revenue for the community budget, for example. 
Most of the benefits mayor’s courts provide and problems they cause, however, are the result of 
a single court making a series of discretionary choices. While some courts may make similar 
types of decisions, the discretionary outcomes—positive or negative—of any given court will not 
necessarily be reflected in other courts. For example, communities that use their mayor’s court 
to generate far more revenue than they receive from taxes have the same discretionary 
authority as other courts, but use it to reach a very different outcome. The same is true for 
certain courts’ assets—a court known for its flexible, personal, and compassionate operations is 
the result of it choosing to use its discretion in a way that other courts do not. 
This distinction is critical to developing policies to maximize the benefits and mitigate the risks of 
mayor’s courts. Structural problems demand a system-wide policy change. On the other hand, 
problems that arise only when certain courts use their discretion poorly are better fixed by either 
tweaks to the governing rules or greater enforcement efforts to bring the rogue court back into 
line 
Common all-or-nothing critiques and endorsements overlook opportunities for politically-viable 
compromises. This paper is in response to reviews that parrot common assertions without 





Mayor's Courts: Shared Background, 
Different Outcomes 
Most Ohio communities with more than 200 citizens and no municipal court can create a 
mayor’s court.  Keeping with Ohio’s strong home-rule tradition, communities make most 5
decisions about their mayor’s court—including whether or not to open it. Theoretically that 
devolution makes the courts more responsive to local values, making the adjudication process 
more flexible and personalized. 
Some courts indubitably deliver those promised benefits, healing the communities they serve in 
the process. Others, however, exploit their residents. Few deny the existence of effective 
mayor’s courts or ineffective mayor’s courts; rather, critics and proponents dispute whether the 
benefits the courts collectively provide justify the system’s existence given the problems it also 
creates. While prominent Ohio politicians have made it their mission to eliminate all mayor’s 
courts, they have been deterred by the collective power of local leaders. 
Longtime Ohio legislator and four-term Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, for 
example, famously called mayor’s courts more fit for a spaghetti western than modern Ohio, 
evoking the worst stereotypes of small-town justice.  Former Ohio Supreme Court Justice 6
Thomas Moyer made it his mission to get the General Assembly to ban mayor’s courts, but he 
too was thwarted. 
Presently mayor’s courts are spread throughout the state, but especially common around 
Cincinnati, Columbus, and Cleveland. They are far more common than the next-most local 
court, Ohio’s municipal and county court. 
5 Ohio Revised Code §1905.01. Exceptions include: 
1. The following municipal corporations are exempted from the 201-person-minimum population threshold: 
Georgetown in Brown county, Mount Gilead in Morrow county, and any municipal corporation located 
entirely on an island in Lake Erie. (citation). While the law allows Georgetown and Mount Gilead to operate a 
mayor’s court regardless of their population, that clause is not used since both communities have 
populations well in excess of 200 people. In 2017 Georgetown had a population of 4,331 and Mount Gilead 
had a population of 3,660 (citation 2017 mayor’s court summary). Only the village of Put-in-Bay takes 
advantage of this exception. In 2017 its population was just 138, but it was still authorized to conduct a 
mayor’s court since it is located entirely on an island in Lake Eerie. (citation 2017 mayor’s court summary) 
2. The following municipal corporations are prohibited from having a mayor’s court regardless of their 
population: Batavia in Clermont county and any municipal corporation where a judge of the Auglaize county, 
Crawford county, Jackson county, Miami county, Montgomery county, Portage county, or Wayne county 
municipal court sits. 





Figure 1: Ohio Court Map 
Mayor’s courts rest at the bottom of Ohio’s judicial system and have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the nearest municipal or county court.  Some see the redundancy as an advantage—a key 7
pressure valve relieving the strain on municipal and county courts—while critics characterize the 
courts as backwards vestiges from a bygone era. 
7 When cases from a mayor’s court are appealed, they go to the alternative municipal or county court. If a mayor’s 
court were eliminated, cases would be filed in the municipal or county court alongside those from nearby communities 




Figure 2: Ohio Court Hierarchy  8
Fixing low-level courts, however, should not be a low-priority. Mayor’s courts touch many lives, 
all of which deserve justice. Reforming mayor’s courts is hindered by fuzzy understandings of 
mayor’s courts. Since most courts produce little documentation and each court can vary 
significantly from its peers, many citizens struggle to learn the system’s nuances. 
Making a Mayor’s Court 
Despite its name, most cases a mayor’s court handles do involve the mayor or judge directly. 
Instead, these cases are processed by a violations bureau, which allows defendants to “pay out” 
their “waiverable citation” without setting foot in a mayor’s court.  
While each mayor’s courts is unique, they tend to share several general attributes: 
● Negligible Oversight​.  No Ohio institution has a robust mandate to oversee mayor’s 
courts. Each court is required to submit basic case statistics to the Ohio Supreme Court 
each quarter, but some courts skirt that expectation without facing any consequences.  
9
Knowing they operate with impunity, courts are free to not report data whenever they 
please.  The state auditor’s office is empowered to monitor mayor’s courts and their 10
millions of dollars of revenue, but lacks any enforcement power. Misbehavior must be 
reported to local prosecutors who can choose whether or not to bring a case. The close 
political and social ties common in small towns make it challenging for local prosecutors 
to hold fellow community elites accountable, further neutering official oversight. The state 
8 Chart derived from: “Judicial System Structure,” ​The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System​, 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JudSystem/. 
9 See ​“​Mayor’s Court Education and Procedure Rules,” ​The Ohio Supreme Court​, Rule 15​ for reporting requirements. 




auditor’s office has repeatedly identified misspending and related errors, but little has 
come of its reports.  11
A ​Columbus Dispatch​ study found that nearly twenty percent of the 318 mayor’s court 
audits conducted in 2009 found a problem, including erroneous accounting, lack of 
records, and absence of documentation supporting tickets.  The limited documentation 
12
makes investigating claims of errors or misbehavior difficult. The extensive barriers to 
transparency and state officials’ inaction allows the mayor’s court system to continue 
operating in the shadows with impunity.  
13
Additionally, mayor’s courts’ minimal record-keeping and reporting requirements 
severely limit the opportunities private citizens and advocacy organizations have to 
evaluate their work. Unlike municipal courts, mayor’s courts are not courts of record, 
meaning that they lack court reporters and are not required to audio- or video-record 
court proceedings.  That lack of transparency severely hinders the ability of advocates 
14
and researchers to identify discriminatory, exploitive, or otherwise defective tendencies 
in a given court. Further, the norm of limited record keeping denies mayor’s courts, city 
councils, and state legislators the information to make data-based adjustments to 
improve courts’ quality and efficiency. While older technology may have once made such 
record-keeping and data-tracking cost prohibitive, or at the very least ill-advised, modern 
technology makes transparency achievable. With no institutionally-mandated oversight 
and potential private watchdogs hobbled by the lack of transparency, mayor’s courts are 
free to operate as they see fit without meaningful supervision. 
● Non-judicial Court.​ Unlike many other courts, mayor’s courts are part of the executive 
branch.  Although the Ohio Supreme Court reports data from and makes some rules for 15
mayor’s courts, they are technically more akin to administrative bodies than they are to 
other courts.  For example, the General Assembly controls the responsibilities, salary, 16
and jurisdictions of other Ohio judges, but largely stays away from regulating mayor’s 
courts.  That task falls to communities’ mayors, whose power over their court is only 17
checked by the scant state rules and any restrictions imposed by their community’s 
legislature. 
Most other courts also have greater separation between judges and the prosecutors and 
police departments that argue before them. Mayor’s courts, conversely, are run by the 
mayor or mayor’s appointee, the prosecutor (if used) is generally appointed by the 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The 127th General Assembly introduced legislation to eliminate the mayor’s court system entirely, but it fell well 
short of passing. See Paul Revelson, “Nothing But Trouble: The Ohio Legislature’s Failed Attempts to Abolish 
Mayor’s Courts,” ​University of Dayton Law Review ​35, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 223-246, 
https://udayton.edu/law/_resources/documents/law_review/nothing_but_trouble.pdf. 
14 Ibid. 
15 “Judicial System Structure,” ​The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System​, 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JudSystem/. 
16 Ohio Revised Code §1905.031(A). 




mayor, and in strong-mayor communities the police department ultimately answers to the 
mayor too.  18
● Limited Training.​  Mayors only need six hours of training to run their court, followed by an 
additional three hours of annual continuing education.  Prior experience, a law degree, 19
and even a high school diploma are all unrequired. Ohio teachers,  cosmetologists,  20 21
tanning facility operators,  school district business managers,  and lifeguards  all face 22 23 24
more stringent licensing and education requirements. To also hear cases involving 
alcohol or drug-related traffic offenses, mayors need just six more hours of initial 
classroom training followed by an additional three each year. Those limited education 
programs are the full extent of requirements for a mayor to preside over a mayor’s 
court—a remarkably small portion of the job they were elected to.   25
Requirements are slightly more rigid for magistrates, should a mayor choose one to 
serve in his or her place.  In addition to the mayor’s court-specific education 26
requirements noted above, the Ohio Revised Code requires that a mayor’s court 
magistrate be admitted to the Ohio bar and practiced law in Ohio and/or served as a 
judge of a court of record in any United States jurisdiction for at least three years before 
serving as a mayor’s magistrate.  Unlike mayors, magistrates are all lawyers. 27
The regulatory framework that provides for negligible oversight, places mayor’s courts in the 
executive branch, and demands only limited training governs all mayor’s courts. Individual 
communities, however, also have broad authority to shape their court as they see fit. 
Mayor’s courts generally convene weekly or a few times each month depending on how busy 
the court is, oftentimes in the evenings to reduce conflicts with work schedules. At court 
defendants are entitled to be represented by an attorney, but many mayor’s courts do not 
18 Generally speaking, the strong-mayor form of government empowers the mayor to exercise broad executive 
authority. Weak-mayor forms of government, on the other hand, delegate most executive power to an apolitical city 
manager. 
19 Must be done within 60 days of assuming office or exercising the jurisdiction. See “​Mayor’s Court Education and 
Procedure Rules,” ​The Ohio Supreme Court​, Rule 4. These rules do not apply to a presiding officer who is also 1) “a 
retired judge eligible for assignment by the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court to active duty in the general 
division of the court of common pleas, a municipal court, or a county court,” or 2) “A court magistrate who serves on a 
fulltime or parttime basis in the general division of the court of common pleas, a municipal court, or a county court 
pursuant to the Rules of Criminal or Civil Procedure or the Ohio Traffic Rules.” 
20 “Teacher License Overview,” Ohio Department of Education, 
http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Teaching/Licensure/Apply-for-Certificate-License/Educator-License-Types-and-Desc
riptions ​. 
21 ​Ohio Administrative Code §4713-1-06 ​. 
22 ​Ibid. 
23 Ohio Revised Code §3301.074. 
24 Ohio Administrative Code §901:9-1-12.1. 
25 Even when judges are exclusively overseeing courts, limited training can leave them ill-prepared for their jobs. 
Some Texas judges, for example, were recently exposed for not knowing that they were legally required to assess 
defendants’ ability to pay before incarcerating them. Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: 
Basic Books, 2018), 141. 
26 While the Ohio Supreme Court’s rules for mayor’s courts treats magistrates and mayors as interchangeable actors, 
the law does not. See Rule 2.B Definitions: “"Mayor" means a duly elected or appointed executive of a municipal 
corporation includes a municipal official who is authorized by statute, charter, or municipal ordinance to conduct 
mayor's court in the absence of the mayor, and a magistrate appointed pursuant to section 1905.05 of the Revised 
Code.” See “ ​Mayor’s Court Education and Procedure Rules,” ​The Ohio Supreme Court​. 
27 Ohio Revised Code §1905.05(A). 
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provide public defenders. If a defendant requests a public defender, the case would have to be 
transferred to the municipal court. Court is generally more casual environment than busier, more 
structured courts. Oftentimes cases proceed more as conversations among the mayor or 
magistrate, the prosecutor, and the defendant. Since court sessions are infrequent, a large 
backlog of cases may accrue. Long court sessions incentivizes defendants to pay out and be on 
their way rather than waiting in the queue to challenge their case.  28
These similarities among mayor’s courts should not be taken to suggest they are a unified class. 
They are not. 
Monolithic Mirage 
All mayor’s courts are subject to the same rules, but each court is unique. The discretion in 
setting a court’s jurisdiction and determining how it sanctions alone produces many different 
court experiences. The many discretionary outcomes possible demonstrate just how inaccurate 
the monolithic mirage is. 
Jurisdiction: Commonalities and Discretion 
While state law prohibits mayor’s courts from hearing a wide range of cases, there are no 
positive jurisdictional requirements—mayor’s courts have full discretion to decline to exercise a 
portion of the jurisdiction they are authorized to exercise. As a result, different mayor’s courts 
are free to self-define differing jurisdictions so long as they stay within the maximum bounds set 
by the Ohio Revised Code (ORC). 
Aside from certain exceptions, state law authorizes mayor’s courts to hear cases involving 
violations of their municipality’s ordinances and criminal moving traffic violations that occur on a 
state highway within their municipality’s borders—including vehicle parking or standing 
violations and violations related to operating a vehicle under the influence of a controlled 
substance (OVI).  29
Mayor’s courts are not, however, allowed to hear any felony cases or cases in which the 
defendant is a juvenile. Additionally, mayor’s courts are explicitly denied jurisdiction over the 
following three types of cases: 
● Jury Trials.​  Mayor’s courts are not authorized to conduct jury trials.  In the relatively 30
rare instance that a mayor’s court defendant requests a trial, they must waive their right 
to a jury trial pursuant to ORC 2937.08 and accept a bench trial in the mayor’s court or 
the case will be transferred up to the appropriate municipal court.  31
● Successive OVI and License Suspension Cases.​  Defendants who have been convicted 
of or pled guilty to an OVI within the past ten years cannot have their case heard in a 
28 The Reynoldsburg Mayor’s Court, for example, advised defendants to plan on being at court for “a couple of hours” 
for certain sessions. See “Court: What to Expect,” ​Reynoldsburg Mayor’s Court​, 
http://www.ci.reynoldsburg.oh.us/uploads/documents/departments/courts/what-to-expect.pdf. 
29 Ohio Revised Code §1905.01 A and B. 
30 Ohio Revised Code §2938.04. 
31 Ohio Revised Code §2937.08. 
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mayor’s court.  Similarly, mayor’s courts cannot hear cases in which the defendant is 32
charged with either 1) a violation of Revised Code §4510.16 or a substantively similar 
law, or 2) a violation of Revised Code §4510.14 or a substantively similar law, and has 
been previously convicted of or pled guilty to a comparable offense within the six years 
prior to the most recent incident.  33
● Interpersonal Violence​. Mayor’s courts are barred from hearing cases involving domestic 
violence (ORC §2919.25), violating protective orders (ORC §2919.27), felonious assault 
(ORC §2903.11), aggravated assault (ORC §2903.12), assault (ORC §2903.13), 
menacing by stalking (ORC §2911.211), or matters involving protective orders generally 
(ORC §2919.26).  34
While the jurisdictional rules mayor’s courts face do put meaningful limitations on the the types 
of cases mayor’s courts can hear, they do not have the last word. Instead, they types of cases a 
mayor’s court hears are fully decided by two things: 1) the ordinances the community’s 
legislature passes for the mayor’s court to enforce, and 2) the mayor’s decision over what type 
of cases its court will hear.  35
Many courts limit their jurisdiction. The three types of jurisdictional limitations below highlight 
how much individual mayor’s courts can differ. 
● Waiverable Citations Only.  ​Some courts only hear waiverable citations, or cases for 
which the community has set a predetermined fine that defendants can paid instead of 
appearing in court. While each court approaches waiverable citations differently, most 
courts require appearances for defendants with multiple offenses in a short period of 
time, more severe offenses (typically criminal charges require appearances relative to 
traffic citations), and charges the defendant wishes to contest. For example, in the 
Yellow Springs Mayor’s Court, defendants accused of violating the right of way of a 
funeral procession, wearing earphones while driving, or making a prohibited left from US 
Bank can generally all pay a $105 fine to settle the case without appearing in court.  36
However any defendants accused of passing bad checks, street racing, or assault all 
must appear before the mayor.  37
Courts that only process waiverable citations, however, push cases requiring 
appearances off onto their respective municipal or county court. The Chagrin Falls 
Mayor’s Court, for example, only hears waiverable citations meaning cases including 
speeding charges in excess of twenty miles-per-hour above the limit, a third or higher 
number violation within the past 12 months, or those in which the defendant seeks to 
contest the charges are automatically transferred out. If it were truly a working mayor’s 
32 Per Ohio Revised Code §1095.01 B, this includes violations of municipal OVI ordinances, violations of state OVI 
laws in Revised Code §4511.19, and violations of federal or other state or local statutes that are substantially similar 
to Revised Code §4511.19. Once the presiding officer of the mayor’s court becomes aware of the previous such 
offense, that officer must immediately transfer the case to the municipal court pursuant to Revised Code §1905.032. 
33 Ohio Revised Code §1905.01 C. 
34 Ohio Revised Code §1905.01 E. 
35 The Ohio Revised Code notes that mayor’s ​may​ operate a mayor’s court, but only the mayor can choose the extent 
to which he or she exercises that jurisdiction—if at all. ​State ex rel. Boston Heights v. Petsche, 27 Ohio App. 3d 106. 




court—like most of the other mayor’s courts—the mayor or magistrate would hear many 
of the cases that are transferred.  38
● Arraignment Court.  ​Arraignment courts, like the Geneva-on-the-Lake Mayor’s Court, do 
not conduct trials—any defendant who pleads not guilty to the charges has their case 
automatically transferred to their municipal court.  Unlike courts that only hear 39
waiverable citations, arraignment courts process cases that require a court appearance. 
The case only has to be transferred if the defendant pleads not guilty. Since only three 
defendants pled not guilty in the Geneva-on-the-Lake Mayor’s Court in 2017, the court 
transferred fewer cases than it would have had it been exclusively a waiverable citations 
court; the Chagrin Falls Mayor’s Court would have had far more transfers.  40
● Declining Certain Case Types.​  While many mayor’s courts process cases of those who 
are accused of driving with a suspended license, the Avon Mayor’s Court does not. 
Instead, those cases are automatically transferred to the Avon Lake Municipal Court.  41
Similarly, the Minster Mayor’s Court does not hear any cases relating to driving under 
suspension, license forfeiture, or OVIs.  Instead the Minster Police Department files 42
those cases directly with the local municipal court meaning that mayor’s court never 
interacts with them.   43
Even though all mayor’s courts are subject to the same jurisdictional laws, they do not all 
exercise the same jurisdiction. This is by design—mayor’s courts are given significant discretion 
to serve their community’s needs and values in the most tailored way possible. While municipal 
and county courts also provide somewhat localized justice, individual courts have less flexibility, 
serve more people, and are more insulated from (and thus less responsive to) the preferences 
of the people they serve. 
Sanctioning 
The presiding officer of a mayor’s court—whether a mayor or appointed magistrate—has broad 
authority to decide cases, sentence defendants, and compel attendance and decorum at court. 
By issuing bench warrants (which some jurisdictions call capias warrants) and suspending 
defendants’ driver’s licenses for failing to appear at their appointed court time, the presiding 
officer can have a profound effect on defendants’ lives even if they are ultimately found not 
guilty.  44
As with most court functions, the presiding officer has significant discretion. Several illustrative 
mayor’s courts’ approaches are highlighted below: 
● Limited Sanction Use​.  The Geneva-on-the-Lake Mayor’s Court is a small court overseen 
by a part-time magistrate. She issues warrants to get around a bug in the court’s 
38 Patricia Chambers, email message to author, December 27, 2018. 
39 Alicia Boothe, email message to author, December 20, 2018. 
40 Geneva-on-the-Lake Mayor’s Court Transfer Records, 2017. 
41 Monica Argenti, email message to author, January 31, 2019. 
42 Rachel Ranly, email message to author, December 20, 2018. 
43 Rachel Ranly, email message to author, December 20, 2018. 





software, but never acts on them.  Other courts, like the New Knoxville Mayor’s Court 45
rarely, if ever, use bench warrants or license forfeitures.  46
● Sanctions for Failure to Pay​.  The Canfield Mayor’s Court issues bench warrants for 
defendants who fail to appear in court, but uses license suspensions differently. All 
defendants there are offered a payment plan for their fines and costs, which requires a 
payment be made every 30 days. If the defendant fails to pay, a bill is sent to them. If the 
defendant still does not respond, they receive another 30-day notice and the license 
forfeiture process starts.  Unless the issue is resolved after the second warning, the 47
defendant’s license is immediately suspended at the end of the third, thirty-day period.  48
At the Canfield Mayor’s Court, however, defendants’ licenses are not suspended for 
failing to appear in court. 
● Frequent Sanctioning​. Other courts use bench warrants frequently. In 2017 nearly 16% 
of all cases heard in the Westerville Mayor’s Court are hearings for failure-to-appear 
charges.  These aggressive practices can cause significant harm to those affected, but 49
are by no means representative of all mayor’s courts.  50
Individual courts have wide discretion to determine what justifies harsher punishments and 
presiding officers are free to make whatever policy decisions they feel are best for their court. If 
local communities disagree, they can vote the mayor out at the next election. 
Differing jurisdiction and sanctioning outcomes show that structural factors are usually just a 
point of departure. Understanding the uniqueness of individual mayor’s courts is critical to 
appropriately tailoring reforms. 
Discussing Reforms 
Current debates about the future of mayor’s courts perpetuate the myth that mayor’s courts are 
a singular, monolithic entity. In failing to appreciate the effects of discretion, we likewise fail to 
target critiques to a specific source—either bad actors or truly systemic factors. 
Reformers must identify the precise cause of injustice, inefficiency, and other shortcomings, 
then regulate accordingly. Instead, current discussions carelessly create an artificial dichotomy: 
keep mayor’s courts or abandon them. 
More pragmatic advocates can promote nuanced reforms in two primary ways: 
45 Alicia Boothe, email message to author, December 20, 2018. 
46 Abigail Homan, email message to author, December 21, 2018. 
47 Lynda Seabrook, email message to author, January 11, 2019. 
48 Lynda Seabrook, email message to author, January 11, 2019. 
49 Westerville Mayor’s Court Daily Filing Reports, 2017. 





● Enforcement of Current Rules.​  Courts sometimes continue prohibited practices.  Prior 51
rulings highlight litigation opportunities for defendants suffering through illegal 
procedures.  52
● Advocacy for new Rules.​  In courts, town halls, and the statehouse reformers can assert 
that certain practices should be disallowed. New evidence and heightened awareness 
about the societal dangers introduced by low-level courts make the environment ripe for 
change.  
Hardly anyone thinks the current mayor’s court arrangement is perfect, but the debate over 
whether or not the whole system should be eliminated deprives more nuanced reform efforts of 
oxygen. At the end of the twentieth century, the Ohio Supreme Court’s Chief Justice, Thomas 
Moyer, created The Futures Commission to review how Ohio’s judicial system should operate 
over the next twenty-five years. As the Commission’s Organization and Structure Task Force 
Director Laralyn Sasaki reflected in 1998, “It's not that the current [mayor’s court] system has 
serious flaws, but I defy anyone to say that if there'd been a blank slate when Ohio was 
established that our system is what would have been designed."  53
As more critics begin to argue that the system does, in fact, have serious flaws, the reform 
conversation has shifted from asking how to improve mayor’s courts to asking how to get rid of 
them. The failed efforts to block Cuyahoga Fall’s mayor’s court show just how difficult it is to 
strike some mayor’s courts, let alone all of them. Since many mayor’s courts provide their 
communities critical funding streams, eliminating them carries high costs for state legislators. 
Political feasibility aside, many mayor’s court critics fail to even distinguish between problems 
with individual courts and problems inherent or likely to appear in any mayor’s court. 
Systemic problems require wide-reaching reforms, whereas problems with the way a particular 
court is using its discretion can be resolved with a lighter touch. When legislators realized that 
the fiscal pressures in small communities were corrupting nearly all the mayor’s courts in 
communities with fewer than 100 residents, they banned only those affected. Upon realizing the 
impulse toward revenue-generation was also too strong in communities with fewer than 200 
residents, they barred mayor’s courts there too. It is an easy, but costly mistake to cite three 
assorted mayor’s courts that appear to be pursuing revenue at the expense of justice as 
evidence that all mayor’s courts are infirm. 
Some mayor’s courts use their discretion to offer greater personalization, flexibility, and 
compassion than other courts, advantages that would be lost if mayor’s courts were eradicated. 
51 In perhaps the most striking example of disallowed rules being continued, Chief Justice of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, Jean Hoefer Toal, did not believe in the constitutional right to counsel in low-level cases and so 
“simply told my magistrates that we just don’t have the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up we [are] not 
adhering to” that rule. See Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 192. 
52 Mayor’s courts’ limited transparency makes it difficult to discover when and where rules are being broken. Limited 
training for court staffs can make it difficult for them to know when longstanding practices are no longer allowed. The 
combination creates an environment ripe for rules going unenforced. Even non-mayor’s courts sometimes deviate 
from the rules. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court banned incarcerating people for failing to pay criminal court 
costs, but courts routinely do anyways. Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic Books, 
2018), 142. 





Proposing to resolve bad-apple problems by banning large cohorts of valuable, just mayor’s 
courts is a net loss for society.  
Mayor’s courts’ alleged problems and benefits fall into one of two general categories: 
● Systemic.​  Systemic problems and benefits come from the rules that set the bounds for 
all mayor’s courts’ behavior. These systemic factors include the extent or nature of the 
discretion given to individual courts, the types of behavior expressly encouraged or 
allowed (like having a non-lawyer preside over contested trials), or other structural 
factors like the extent of oversight, reporting requirements, and training mandates. These 
elements inherently shape the behavior of every mayor’s court. 
● Bad Apples.​  Individual critiques target unique behavior, for example a specific court or 
small group of courts using their discretion in an unsavory way. While constraining 
discretion may stop this sort of behavior, the discretion itself is not inherently the 
problem. In other words, many courts that enjoy the same discretion do not reach the 
same outcomes; bad behavior can be stopped without eliminating the discretion. For 
example, the same discretion may enable valuable personalization in some mayor’s 
courts while enabling gross favoritism in others. Eliminating the discretion would 
eliminate both outcomes, but the negative outcome could also be eliminated by a more 
robust oversight and enforcement regime to ensure the rogue court behaved 
appropriately.  
Understanding the role of discretion is important for designing sound reforms; enlightened and 
despotic courts alike enjoy the same discretion. But the discretionary context is only part of the 
equation. As mayor’s courts have evolved, the problems they create have changed too. To best 
reform mayor’s courts, advocates must also evaluate the validity of both systemic and bad apple 
complaints. 
Evolution of Mayor’s Courts 
Mayor’s courts trace their roots back to the oldest court of England: The Court of Our Sovereign 
Lady the Queen, Holden before the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London.  These local 
54
courts were embraced in the colonies too, perhaps most prominently in New York City.  Few 
55
records survive from early mayor’s courts, but litigation records refer to now defunct mayor’s 
court systems operating in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, New 
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West 
54 Floyd A. Buras, III, ​The Louisiana Mayor’s Court: An Overview and Its Constitutional Problems​ (Bloomington: 
Author House, 2015), 2. 
55 Ibid, 3. 
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Virginia.  While somewhat similar courts exist in other states today, true mayor’s court systems 
56
only still exist in Louisiana and Ohio. 
Ohio’s first version of a mayor’s court was founded in Cincinnati in 1815.  By 1851, the state’s 
57
new constitution codified the form of mayor’s court that exists today.  They could only operate 
58
in “second class” cities with populations between 5,000 and 20,000 and in incorporated villages 
with populations below 5,000 and heard cases involving local ordinance violations and matters 
that justices of peace could hear: The jurisdictions covered all violations of city or village 
ordinances and matters that justices of peace could hear: cases involving “arrests; preliminary 
hearings, . . . [and] affrays” for criminal matters and “in certain cases up to $100.00; voluntary 
confession up to $200.00” for civil matters.  At the time, justice of the peace courts and police 59
courts (which only heard criminal matters in cities with populations over 20,000) also provided 
local judicial services. 
Today, mayor’s courts are the only component of the 1851 judicial system that remains. By the 
1950s, police and justice of the peace courts had been replaced by municipal and county 
courts. Mayor’s courts, however, have evolved significantly since then. The most recent reforms 
have progressively adjusted the population requirements for communities to operate a mayor’s 
court. 
In recent years, there have been several major attempts to change the population threshold: 
● Fewer than 100 Residents.​  In May of 2003, Ohio passed a law barring mayor’s courts 
from operating in communities with fewer than 100 residents. It had become clear that 
the limited number of mayor’s courts operating in communities that small were almost 
uniformly exploiting their discretion, collecting immense sums to fund tiny communities. 
The Village of New Rome (population 60) ran one of the courts targeted by the reform. 
Known for its history of fiscal mismanagement, questionable elections practices, and 
extensive traffic fines, the community made hundreds of thousands of dollars each year 
by issuing speeding tickets, primarily on the 1,000-foot stretch of U.S. 40 within its 
jurisdiction. Its secret? The speed limit of that stretch was 10 miles per hour slower than 
it was outside New Rome. 
 
By running a mayor’s court that kept fine revenue within the community, New Rome was 
able to easily monetize its speed trap. The reform that took away its financial lifeline split 
56 Example cases include ​Withers v. State, ​36 Alabama 252 (1860); ​Williams v. State​, 63 Arkansas 307 (1896); ​Bates 
v. Porter ​, 74 California 224 (1887); ​Gray v. State​, 2 Delaware 76 (1836); ​State ex rel. Duke v. Wills​, 49 Florida 380 
(1905); ​W. & A. R. Co. v. Atlanta​, 113 Georgia 537 (1901); ​Finch v. Marvin​, 46 Iowa 384 (1877); ​Bryan v. Bates, ​15 
Illinois 87 (1853); ​Waldo v. Wallace​, 12 Indiana 479 (1859); ​Prell v. McDonald​, 7 Kansas 426 (1871); ​Shinkle v. 
Covington ​, 83 Kentucky 420 (1885); ​Welles v. City of Detroit​, 2 Doug. 77 (Michigan 1845); ​Dulaney on Behalf of Lord 
Proprietary v. Jennings ​, 1 H. & McH. 92 (Maryland 1738); ​Leonard v. Sparks​, 63 Missouri App. 585 (1890); ​Griffin v. 
State, ​127 Mississippi 315 (1921); ​Scott v. Fishblate​, 117 North Carolina 265 (1895); ​State v. Gratz​, 86 New Jersey 
483 (1914); ​Simson v. Hart​, 14 Johns. 63 (New York 1816);​ Baker v. Marcum & Toomer​, 22 Oklahoma 21 (1908); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney-Gen. V. Conyngham, ​65 Pennsylvania 76 (1870); ​Greenville v. Spencer​, 77 South 
Carolina 50 (1907); ​Newbern v. McCann​, 105 Tennessee 159 (1900); ​Ex parte Scwartz​, 2 Texas Ct. App. 74 (1877); 
Young v. Cannon ​, 2 Utah 560 (1880); ​Brooks v. Potomac​, 149 Virginia 427 (1928); ​Rowlesburg v. Zelano​ 74 West 
Virginia 142 (1914). 
57 Paul Revelson, “Nothing But Trouble: The Ohio Legislature’s Failed Attempts to Abolish Mayor’s Courts,” ​University 
of Dayton Law Review ​35, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 223-246, 
https://udayton.edu/law/_resources/documents/law_review/nothing_but_trouble.pdf. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Carrington T. Marshall, ​A History of the Courts and Lawyers of Ohio​, 1934, 90. 
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the community. A councilman who had previously led a failed effort to dissolve the 
village celebrated that “justice is going to be served instead of [the mayor’s court] just 
being a revenue-producing business for New Rome.” The lawyer who served as the 
court’s magistrate for several months in 2001 was more glum, reflecting that the loss 
could be “the death knell of New Rome.” While losing an estimated two-thirds of its 
revenue could indeed cripple New Rome, his concern for the village’s survival highlights 
how critical court revenue can become for communities, raising troubling questions 
about the impartiality of those courts, the role of police in that community, and the 
appropriateness of uniting justice and fundraising. 
● Fewer than 200 Residents​.  In December 2012, the Ohio General Assembly banned 
mayor’s courts in communities with fewer than 200 residents. As with the ban on mayor’s 
courts in communities with fewer than 100 residents, it was clear to lawmakers that 
nearly all small mayor’s courts had gone rogue. One of the courts closed—the Linndale 
Mayor’s Court—highlights the lengths these communities go to to maintain funding flows. 
Efforts to eliminate Linndale’s (population 178) aggressive ticketing practices go back 
decades. Linndale tickets heavily on its 442-yard strip of Interstate 71 despite not having 
any ramps on or off of the freeway, casting doubt on the tickets’ safety justifications. 
State Representative Edward F. Kasputis, for example, argued that since Linndale roads 
were wholly disconnected from the freeway, there were only financial incentives to ticket 
so heavily. After he led efforts to outlaw Linndale’s ticketing processes in 1994, the 
community fought back, eventually getting the Ohio Supreme Court to overturn the ban 
for violating Linndale’s home-rule authority. In 2009, the Linndale Mayor’s Court 
collected $490,320, nearly six times the amount of revenue it generated in taxes.  60
Revenue continued to grow until the court was closed again in 2013. Since the mayor’s 
court had been backstopping an obscene ticket rate, losing it caused annual ticket 
revenue to plummet from about $866,000 to around $10,000.  If all of Ohio ticketed with 61
the same rate as Linndale, it would have issued 531,140,644 driving citations in 2012. 
Instead, the State Highway Patrol issues fewer than 1/1000 of that many tickets.  The 62
reality that losing the revenue produced by a high ticketing rate poses an existential 
threat to communities shows how dependent small communities can become on non-tax 
revenue. 
That dependency forced Linndale to search for an alternative. Quickly. 
On December 13, 2013, less than a year after losing its mayor’s court, Linndale bounced 
back with a traffic camera-administrative hearing scheme. Over the first 65 weeks of the 
system, Linndale brought in more than $1 million.  63
 
60 Justin Conley and Rebecca McKinsey, “Ohio’s Mayor’s Courts, Big Business,” ​The Columbus Dispatch​, July 22, 
2012, https://www.dispatch.com/article/20120722/NEWS/307229922. 
61 In 2007, it generated even more revenue—nearly $1 million. See: Robert Higgs, “How Ohio Lawmakers Tried to 
Shut Down Linndale Traffic Enforcement—And How Linndale Fought Back,” ​Cleveland.com​, February, 2016, 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2016/02/how_ohio_lawmakers_tried_to_sh.html ​.  
62 Rex Santus, “Linndale, Other Villages Thwarted in Effort to Save Mayor’s courts,” ​The Plain Dealer​, March 20, 
2013, ​https://www.cleveland.com/open/2013/03/linndale_other_villages_thwart.html​. 
63Robert Higgs, “How Ohio Lawmakers Tried to Shut Down Linndale Traffic Enforcement—And How Linndale Fought 
Back,” ​Cleveland.com​, February, 2016, 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2016/02/how_ohio_lawmakers_tried_to_sh.html ​.  
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● Failed Efforts​.  Even if population floors failed to eliminate communities’ aggressive 
fundraising tactics, they did eliminate their mayor’s courts. Other bills did not make it that 
far. Many versions of a 1,000-resident population floor, for example, have failed.  Court 64
supporters, especially local power brokers who depend on mayor’s court revenue, have 
presented a potent political force to retain their financial lifelines. Their lobbying allows 
financially-dependent communities to continue operating their mayor’s court. The 
Hanging Rock Mayor’s Court, for example, reported $401,218 of revenue in 2009 about 
95 times the amount its 221 residents paid in local taxes.   65
Other reforms have tried to set population ceilings for mayor’s court communities. The 
most prominent such reform attempt targeted the Cuyahoga Falls Mayor’s Court, which 
had the third highest caseload of all Ohio mayor’s courts in 2010 (7,619 cases), about a 
75% increase from its 4,354 cases in 2009. Cuyahoga Falls, population 49,652, was 
also the largest community running a mayor’s court. 
Notorious for promoting frequent traffic stops, Cuyahoga Falls Police Chief Thomas 
Pozza cites a story of two people being arrested for burglarizing a restaurant as 
evidence his methods work. As the offenders see the officers’ uniforms, one says to the 
other “Had I known we were in Cuyahoga Falls, we wouldn’t have done this. We thought 
we were in Akron.”  The story’s veracity matters less than the pride with which the chief 66
shares it, showing how deeply narratives of autonomous safety are ingrained in mayor’s 
court models. Of course, the money does not hurt either. Mayor Don Robart made a 
point of comparing the mayor’s court, which grossed $750,000 in 2012, to the municipal 
court that once sat in Cuyahoga Falls and cost the community about $250,000 each 
year.  The roughly $1 million swing into the black gave powerful Cuyahoga Falls 67
politicians strong incentives to fight to keep their court, allowing them to outlast state 
politicians and avoid the ban. 
Since the latest failed reforms, much of the reform debate has focused on whether or not to 
eradicate mayor’s courts wholesale. Facially sound, but substantively fuzzy complaints portray 
the mayor’s court system as a singular, monolithic entity. Not only is that an inaccurate 
representation, but it also leads to a debate that directs too much attention to unduly extreme 
positions: to keep mayor’s courts largely as they are or to eliminate all or many of them. By 
recognizing the variation in mayor’s courts, reformers can better improve mayor’s courts and, 
more importantly, the lives of the people who interact with them. As the political debacle over 
the Cuyahoga Falls Mayor’s Court demonstrates, mayor’s courts’ strong local support has 
created a robust political gridlock. There may be room for the General Assembly and local 
communities to create mutually-beneficial and meaningful reforms to improve mayor’s courts 
statewide and check the behavior of bad actors, but that reform potential is going unrealized as 
attention is instead focused on the false dichotomy of the eradication debate. 
64 Jim Siegel, “House Bill Targets Mayor’s Courts,” ​The Blade​, November 27, 2012, 
https://www.toledoblade.com/Politics/2012/11/27/House-bill-targets-mayor-s-courts.html ​. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Rick Armon, “Cuyahoga Falls Mayor's Court Bustling, but Numbers Statewide Fall,” ​The Akron Beacon Journal​, 





Present-day mayor’s court problems are largely the result of systemic financial incentives 
leading officials astray, individual courts operating unjustly, and a general lack of transparency 
that denies citizens, legislators, and other watchdogs the opportunity to identify when a problem 
arises. Their benefits are the fruit of the trust and discretion each court receives. While many 
courts do not reap the full benefit they could, those that use their discretion wisely make their 
communities safer and more just. With so little information about mayor’s courts available, 
alleged problems and benefits abound even as evidence of them remains scarce. Careful 
analysis of individual mayor’s court’s records, summary data, and local reporting from 
throughout the state, however, reveals a robust representation of how the mayor’s court system 





An (Ohio) Spaghetti Western: High 
Profit, Low Transparency 
Current critics claim that conflict of interest, biased outcomes, and skimming undermine mayor’s 
courts’ value. As a result, they argue, mayor’s courts should be eliminated. 
That recommendation is misguided and incompletely supported. Conflict of interest exists, to an 
extent, but not as fully as critics assert. For example, many contend that systemic classism and 
racism produces biased outcomes in mayor’s courts. But these insidious tendencies affect other 
courts too, so eliminating mayor’s courts just pushes defendants to suffer in a different forum. 
The most salient claims turn on money. Communities addicted to mayor’s court funding cannot 
claim justice as their lodestar. When fundraising becomes the dominant motivation, it skims 
revenue away from municipal and county courts and prevents the court from operating fairly. 
Money may assert too much influence in many courts, but its role is especially problematic in 
mayor’s courts. Perverse financial incentives, however, can be corrected without eliminating all 
mayor’s courts. 
To reach sound policy improvements, we must evaluate the validity of major critiques of mayor’s 
courts. 
Conflict of Interest 
For nearly a century, officials and laypeople alike have questioned the impartiality of mayor’s 
courts. The most egregious arrangements—like those that only pay the mayor for 
convictions—have been struck by the courts and largely rejected by the public. Worries about 
conflicting interests corrupting the fairness of mayor’s court outcomes, however, remain. 
Many critiques imprecisely identify the source of the conflict they allege. While the name 
“mayor’s courts” lends itself to skepticism, criticisms that seek to promote change must go 
beyond raising general skepticism. Instead, reform-sparking criticisms ought to cite specific 
errors and articulate why they represent a real or perceived conflict of interest that is severe 
enough to undermine the credibility of the court or the fairness of its decisions. 
Conflicts of interest, or the perception thereof, can arise in three general ways in mayor’s courts. 
● Dual-hatted Mayors. ​ When the mayor presides over the court and conducts other 
responsibilities as mayor, conflicts of interest may arise between his or her judicial and 
executive duties.  Mayors throughout Ohio have varying degrees of both judicial and 68
partisan responsibilities, so dual-hatted conflicts are individualized problems—they arise 
68 In extreme cases, mayor’s run a court that tries defendants arrested by “their guys” in the police department. There 
partisan duties stopping crime, monitoring finances, and managing the police in the community clash with running a 
fair and neutral court. 
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in a specific set of courts, as operated. Dual-hat problems are also the most heavily 
litigated; mayor’s court litigation has overwhelmingly focused on the appropriate balance 
of judicial and partisan responsibilities that a normal mayor can handle. 
● Mayor-appointed Magistrates​.  Many mayors appoint a magistrate to run the court in 
their place. Mayor-magistrate relationships often escape scrutiny based on the untested 
assumption that there is a wall of separation between the two offices. Given the broad 
discretion some mayors have to replace the magistrate, the mayor’s ability to hear cases 
even if a magistrate has been appointed, and the close personal and professional 
relationships between many mayors and magistrates, that assumption is dubious. At the 
very least, potential for conflicts of interest should be studied. 
● Financially-motivated Courts.​  The worry that mayor’s courts sacrifice justice for profit is 
not unique to them, but is especially relevant. Since mayor’s courts enforce community 
ordinances, city councils have wide discretion to determine a) the offenses the court 
adjudicates, b) the punishments and fines the court issues, and c) the fees charged for 
using the court.  Further, the mayor (or city manager depending on the community) 69
oversees the police department which orders defendants to the mayor’s court. Mayor’s 
court cases (as in most other courts) are hardly ever contested or go to trial, meaning 
that nearly all citations the police issue result in convictions and fines and fees being 
collected. 
Much of the revenue from fines and fees returns to the community’s general fund, which 
the mayor and city council can then spend as they see fit. The ability to collect significant 
funds for community initiatives without raising taxes introduces meaningful electoral 
incentives to maximize mayor’s court revenue. Fundraising under the guise of correcting 
deviant behavior makes collection more socially palatable than taxation. Further, mayor’s 
courts collect revenue from residents (read: potential voters) and non-residents, 
spreading the “tax burden” to non-constituents. 
Police departments also have their own reasons to boost court activity. Many 
departments’ budgets are sustained or supplemented by mayor’s court revenue. In small 
communities with small budgets, convictions, generally speaking, are the most reliable 
way to meet salary and afford new equipment. 
Individual courts can experience conflicts of interest through some, all, or none of those 
channels. 
Dual-hatted Mayors 
Mayorship entails different responsibilities in different communities—from largely ceremonial 
roles to powerful executive functions. A specific mayor’s role—and a specific mayor’s court’s 
role in its government—are critical factors in evaluating potential dual-hatted conflicts of interest. 
Several landmark court cases have attempted to define the extent to which mayors can wear 
both judicial and partisan hats. 
69 Legislatures in communities without city councils enjoy the same discretion. 
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Tumey v. Ohio​ 1927  70
To better equip communities to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment, Ohio passed the State 
Prohibition Act. Among other things, it authorized communities to allocate a portion of the fines 
collected from prohibition violators to those doing the enforcement.  With that authority, the 71
Village Council of North College Hill passed Ordinance No. 125, Section V of which provided: 
“That the mayor of the village of North College Hill, Ohio, shall ​receive or retain the amount of 
his costs​ in each case, in addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing such 
cases.” Since the costs the mayor retained were only paid when the defendant was found guilty, 
the mayor got paid when he convicted and earned nothing when he found the defendant not 
guilty. Like the Fugitive Slave Act, Ordinance No. 125 also allocated costs paid by convicted 
defendants to the mayor’s marshals, inspectors, and detectives.  In other words, every 72
conviction lined the pockets of those involved in the convicting; every acquittal left the courts’ 
agents empty-handed. 
Ordinance No. 125 was, unsurprisingly, controversial. In fact, a petition opposing the ordinance 
and signed by a majority of the village’s voters was presented to Mayor Pugh (who took office 
after the ordinance’s passage). Mayor Pugh was unmoved, however, noting that he would carry 
on the “Liquor Court” so long as the village was in need of finances. From May 11, 1923 to 
December 31, 1923 alone, the court provided significant revenue to the village and its key 
stakeholders, including $696.35 to Mayor Pugh (in addition to his regular salary).  
70 ​Tumey v. Ohio ​, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
71 In relevant part, §6212-37 allows that “​The council of any city or village may be ordinance, authorize the use of any 
part of the fines collected for the violation of any law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, for 
the purpose of hiring attorneys, detectives, or secret service officers to secure the enforcement of such prohibition 
law ​. And such council are hereby authorized to appropriate not more than five hundred dollars annually from the 
general revenue funds, for the purpose of enforcing the law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating 
liquors, when there are no funds available from the fines collected for the violation of such prohibitory law.” Ohio 
General Code quoted in ​Tumey v. Ohio​, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 




Figure 3: North College Hill Mayor's Court Revenue Allocations 
(May 11, 1923-December 31, 1923) 
Expense Amount (1923 dollars) Amount (2019 dollars) 
Court Expenses $438.50 $6,518.68 
TOTAL EXPENSES $438.50 $6,518.68 
Benefactor Amount (1923 dollars) Amount (2019 dollars) 
Mayor Pugh $696.35 $10,351.84 
Liquor Court Prosecutor $1,796.50 $26,706.51 
Deputy Marshals, Inspectors, 
Detectives, & Other Employees $2,697.75 $40,104.37 
North College Hill: Village Safety Fund $2,697.25 $40,096.94 
North College Hill: General Uses $4,471.25 $66,468.97 
State $8,992.50 $133,681.23 
TOTAL PAYOUTS $21,351.60 $317,409.86 
 
These perverse incentives confronted Mr. Tumey when he was arrested, charged with 
unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor, and brought before the North College Hill Mayor’s 
Court, presided over by Mayor Pugh. Mayor Pugh denied Tumey’s motion to dismiss the case, 
conducted the trial, convicted Tumey of the original charge, fined him $100, and ordered his 
imprisonment until the fine and costs were paid. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court struck down the Village of North College Hill’s 
system, ruling that “a system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he 
convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice either 
at common law or in this country that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs 
usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the ​maxim de minimis 
non curat lex.​”  73
The mayor’s pecuniary interest, however, was not the only violation of Tumey’s due process 
rights. The authorizing state statute was explicitly designed to incentivize municipalities to 
pursue prohibition cases, so that the prohibition laws might be enforced more uniformly across 
the state, even in smaller, more rural communities. Since the mayor was both tasked with 
looking out for the financial interests of the village and determining guilt and sentencing of 
defendants, the Court held that the Mayor Pugh could not be considered an impartial judge in 
Mr. Tumey’s cases. He was disqualified both because of “his direct pecuniary interest in the 
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the 
financial needs of the village.”  74




While the Court was clear than any meaningful, personal pecuniary interest was cause for 
disqualification, it did not specify the extent of official motive that warranted disqualification. 
Rather than striking all dual-hatted mayoral arrangements, the Court reflected that:  
It is, of course,​ so common ​to vest the mayor of villages with inferior judicial functions 
that the mere union of the executive power and the judicial power in him can not be said 
to violate due process of law. The minor penalties usually attaching to the ordinances of 
a village council, or to the misdemeanors in which the mayor may pronounce final 
judgment without a jury, ​do not involve any such addition to the revenue of the 
village​ as to justify the fear that the mayor would be influenced in his judicial judgment 
by that fact.  75
The Court’s reasoning was colored by the frequency with which executive and judicial roles 
were merged and the perceived irrelevance of the fines collected by mayor’s courts relative to 
the community’s total budget. Today dual-hatted mayors are uncommon and mayor’s courts 
often produce so much revenue relative to the community’s budget that the courts alone can 
keep communities solvent. 
In sum, ​Tumey ​established two guiding principles for evaluating potential due process violations 
in local courts. 
● Situations “in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously 
inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial.” 
● Procedures which “would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to 
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not 
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.” 
The Court left to future cases determinations of what beyond the facts in ​Tumey ​constitutes “two 
practically and seriously inconsistent positions” and what constitutes “a possible temptation.” 
Dugan v. Ohio​ 1928  76
Just over a year after deciding ​Tumey​, the United States Supreme Court heard a similar conflict 
of interest case. 
In 1928, M.J. Dugan was convicted of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor, his second such 
offense, and was fined $1000 by the mayor’s court in Xenia, Ohio.  He asserted that, like Mr. 77
Pugh, the mayor who presided over his trial had a conflict of interest that violated his due 
process rights.  
Unpersuaded, the Supreme Court concluded that the level of conflict was insufficient to render 
the process infirm. It drew two distinctions between Dugan’s case and Tumey’s. 
75 ​Ibid ​. 
76 ​Dugan v. Ohio ​, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). 
77 The same offence from General Code of Ohio §6212-15 as was discussed above. He pled guilty to the initial 
offense in February 1924 and was fined $400, just under $6,000 in 2019 dollars. The $1000 fine is worth roughly 
$14,000 in 2019 dollars. 
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● No Personal Pecuniary Interest​.  The mayor in ​Tumey​ received a bonus in excess of his 
ordinary salary for presiding over the mayor’s court. Since that bonus was funded by 
court costs, which were only paid by defendants found guilty, Mayor Pugh had a 
personal, pecuniary interest in convicting more defendants. Each conviction brought him 
an average of $12 and each acquittal brought him nothing. 
Xenia’s mayor received no such “conviction bonus.” The mayor’s salary did come from a 
general fund, which fines were paid into; however, since other funding streams 
contributed to the account too, there was no evidence to suggest any close relationship 
between the mayor’s decision to acquit or convict and his salary. 
● Lesser Executive Authority.​  Mayor Pugh was the chief executive and chief conservator 
of the peace for North College Hill. He was responsible for the financial state of the 
village and he exercised significant control over the liquor court and those who ran it. As 
a result, a mayor of that nature may be especially tempted to issue fines to grow his 
official reserves to pay the operating expenses of the village, make improvements, and 
reduce taxes. 
The Xenia mayor was no such powerful chief executive. Rather, the city was run by five 
commissioners who exercised the city’s legislative power and selected a manager, with 
whom they exercised the city’s executive power. One of the commissioners served as 
mayor and had no individual, executive responsibilities. While fines and fees from 
convictions did go to the general fund, the Court held that the mayor’s role as merely one 
of five commissioners meant that his connection to the “executive or financial policy of 
the city, [was sufficiently] remote” to prevent any meaningful conflicts of interest.  78
The North College Hill Mayor’s Court model—in which a strong mayor also personally profited 
from convictions he issued—was more unfair than the weak-mayor setup, with no such personal 
stake, that the Xenia Mayor’s court used. In ​Dugan​, the alleged conflict of interest was further 
removed. The mayor undeniably had incentives to convict, but based on the evidence and the 
best assumptions of the time, the Court deemed those incentives insufficient to create a conflict 
of interest. 
Ward v. Monroeville​ 1972  79
In the roughly forty-four years between ​Dugan​ and ​Ward​ reached the United States Supreme 
Court, Ohio’s state laws were overhauled. The Ohio General Code that was at issue in earlier 
cases was replaced by the Ohio Revised Code still in force. Most meaningfully for mayor’s 
courts, this change also added the guaranteed right to ​de novo​ review for all mayor’s court 
cases. That right assured defendants that their case could be heard anew at a higher court if 
they were dissatisfied with their mayor’s court outcome. 
The facts in this case are much closer to those of ​Tumey​ than those of ​Dugan​. The first prong of 
Tumey’s​ test for due process violations—having a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary 
78 The Court’s conclusion here is a premised on an assumption: that a mayor who is one of five legislators and has no 
personal executive authority is not so connected to financial policy or executive decisions to preclude serving as a 
judge. That assumption leaves the door open for future courts to strike a structurally similar arrangement if there is 
evidence that, as applied for that community, the remoteness assumption made in ​Dugan ​does not hold.  
79 ​Ward v. Village of Monroeville​, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
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interest in reaching a conclusion against the defendant in his or her case”—was not at issue in 
Ward​. Rather, the mayor’s broad executive authorities and the significant role mayor’s court 
revenues played relative to the community’s total revenue led the plaintiff to assert that his due 
process rights were violated. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that those potentially conflicting temptations did not violate a 
defendant’s due process rights, because the defendant’s right to ​de novo​ review allowed a fresh 
start. The United States Supreme Court did not give as much weight to the guaranteed appeal, 
overturned the lower court’s decision, and struck the system in question. 
Under the authority of new ORC §1905.01, the Mayor of Monroeville convicted Ward of two 
traffic violations and fined him $50 for each. 
In striking the process, the Court differentiated the Monroeville mayor’s role from that in ​Dugan 
for two reasons. 
● Broad executive authority.  ​The Mayor of Monroeville’s significant executive powers 
included being the chief conservator of the peace, presiding over the village council and 
its meetings, voting in the case of a tie on the council, and filling vacancies of village 
offices. Unlike in ​Dugan,​ where the city was largely run by a city manager and five 
commissioners, the mayor here played a meaningful executive and judicial role. 
● Close financial relationship.  ​The mayor reported annually on the village finances to the 
council and had general supervision of village affairs, including finances. The mayor and 
his staff recognized the role the mayor’s court, if used cleverly, could play in the village’s 
financial situation. Monroeville’s Police Chief (who was appointed by the mayor), for 
example, testified that he regularly charged suspects under a village ordinance rather 
than a state statute whenever the choice arose—​per the mayor’s orders​. That decision is 
especially colored by Ohio Revised Code §733.40, which ordered that fines and fees the 
mayor collected in state cases went to the county treasury, while those collected in 
ordinance and traffic cases paid into the municipality’s treasury. 
Perhaps as a result of those policies, the mayor’s court revenue—from fines, forfeitures, 
costs, and fees, all imposed by the mayor—were critical to Monroeville’s overall fiscal 
wellbeing. The funds were so important that when the 102nd General Assembly passed 
the County Court law, reducing jurisdictional powers of mayor’s courts as of January 1, 
1960, Monroeville hired a management consultant to help guide the village’s response. 
The result was Ordinance No. 59-9, which in part opined that the legislation “may cause 
such a reduction in revenue to this village that an additional burden may result from 
increased taxation and/or curtailment of services essential to the health, welfare and 
safety of this village.” Despite the new legislation, mayor’s court revenue still composed 




Figure 4: Monroeville Mayor's Court Revenue 
as Percent of Total Village Revenue (1964-1968)  80
Year 
Dollars Spent 2019 Dollars 
% Mayor's 








1964 $23,589.50 $46,355.38 $191,794.85 $376,893.24 50.89% 
1965 $18,508.95 $46,752.60 $149,040.35 $376,467.82 39.59% 
1966 $16,085.00 $43,585.13 $127,078.08 $344,340.34 36.90% 
1967 $20,060.65 $53,931.43 $153,188.37 $411,834.50 37.20% 
1968 $23,439.42 $52,995.95 $173,709.61 $392,753.14 44.23% 
 
Together, the mayor’s executive powers and close connection to the communities’ financial 
stake in the court violated the defendant’s due process rights. While both indicators of bias were 
present, the court intimated that due process rights may still be violated without a mayor’s court 
failing both tests. Importantly, it observed: “Plainly that ‘possible temptation’ may also exist 
when the mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to 
maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.” 
Clearly the Court’s thinking had evolved since ​Tumey.​ In affirming the general 
C=constitutionality of the mayor’s court system then, the Court reported that the minor penalties 
at stake in mayor’s courts “do not involve any such addition to the revenue of the village as to 
justify the fear that the mayor would be influenced in his judicial judgment by that fact.” 
The possible temptation test is not be treated as a two-part binary evaluation. Instead, individual 
mayor’s courts may be evaluated on two spectra: the breadth of executive power held by the 
mayor and the mayor’s proximity to community’s finances. The specific facts and nuances of a 
given court’s arrangement will determine its Constitutionality, but, generally speaking, those 
courts that fall in quadrant one are more liable to be violating defendant’s due process rights 
than those in quadrant four. 
80 In considering this data in its opinion, the Court did not note the percentage of total revenue represented by 
mayor’s court revenue, only that a “major part” of the village’s income came from the mayor’s court, as evidenced by 




Together, ​Tumey​, ​Dugan​, and ​Ward​ set the broad constraints for what is a permissible 
connection between the judge of a mayor’s court and other, potentially conflicting interests. 
These cases still govern the mayor-run trials. 
Analysis: Dual-hatted Mayors Today 
For a dual-hatted conflict of interest to arise, the mayor in question must hold a meaningful 
judicial role, overseeing trials in the mayor’s court. Most mayors do not. Of Ohio’s 295 mayor’s 
courts active in 2017, only fifteen actually conducted trials overseen by a mayor. Altogether only 





Figure 6:Trials Conducted by 
Mayor/Acting Mayor (2017) 
Court Number of Trials 
Belpre 15 







Murray City 2 








Of those fifteen courts, two are now clearly devoid of dual-hatted conflict of interests. 
Waynesburg claims to transfer all cases in which the defendant pleads not guilty to the Canton 
Municipal Court.  Assuming the information on their website is true and applicable in all cases, 81
they do not conduct mayor-run trials. In Worthington, Ohio, the council elects a Mayor and 
Vice-Mayor from among the citizens of the municipality. Those selected must be qualified to 
serve on the council, but not a current member; an attorney admitted to the Bar of Ohio; and in 




good-standing with the Supreme Court of Ohio. In serving their two-year terms, the Mayor (or 
the Vice-Mayor in his or her absence) serves two roles: 1) the ceremonial head of the 
municipality, and 2) judge of the Mayor’s Court. In other words, the mayor has no administrative, 
executive, or legislative duties. Thus, only thirteen courts are truly susceptible to dual-hat 
conflict of interest claims. 
Of the remaining 13 courts, four have assorted weak-mayor systems akin to those approved by 
earlier court cases. As in ​Dugan​, all four communities’ executive branches are truly run by a city 
manager who oversees the budget and personnel, leaving negligible executive powers to the 
mayor. 
● Blue Ash.  ​Each December, the Blue Ash City Council elects one of its members to 
serve as mayor for the upcoming year. The mayor presides over council meetings, votes 
on council matters, is the judge of the mayor’s court, and is the official head of the city 
for ceremonial and legal purposes.  82
● Canfield.  ​The citizens of Canfield elect their mayor, but his or her powers are roughly 
equivalent to those of any member of the City Council. The mayor is a member of the 
council with a right to vote on any matter except one relating to the mayor’s removal or 
absence, but can neither veto council decisions nor preside over the council. For 
ceremonial, military, and civil litigation purposes, the mayor is the head of the community 
and the mayor presides over the mayor’s court, but the mayor has no meaningful 
executive powers.  83
● Moraine.  ​The Moraine mayor is elected by the community to be a voting and presiding 
member of the City Council (without veto authority). The mayor has purely ceremonial 
executive powers and the judicial authority to preside over the mayor’s court. His or her 
salary reflects the added responsibility of running the mayor’s court, by providing an 
extra $25 for each pre-scheduled court session he or she attends, up to $1,300 per year. 
What happens at that session, however, has no bearing on the mayor’s payment.  84
● Oakwood.  ​As in Blue Ash, the Oakwood City Council selects one of its own to be Mayor. 
The mayor presides over council meetings and votes as a regular council member, but 
has no veto power. While he or she is the ceremonial head of the city and presides over 
the mayor’s court, the mayor is explicitly denied administrative authority.  85
While the limited executive powers wielded by these four mayors likely do not violate 
defendant’s due process rights in and of themselves, they are not the only relevant factor. 
Money, too, plays a role in determining whether a “possible temptation” arises that may 
pressure the judge to overlook the burden of proof. Here, the ​Ward​ court’s observation that a 
possible temptation may exist when the mayor’s responsibilities for the community’s finances 
render him partisan by pressuring him to “maintain the high level of contribution from the 
mayor’s court” is particularly salient. 
Absent clear evidence of financial influences, however, It is highly unlikely that those four courts 
could be said to suffer from dual-hatted conflicts of interest. The same, however, cannot be said 
82 Charter of the City of Blue Ash, Ohio, last revised November 8, 2016. 
83 Codified Ordinances of Canfield, Ohio, last revised July 1, 2018. 
84 Charter of the City of Moraine, Ohio, last revised May 19, 2015. 
85 Charter of the City of Oakwood, Ohio, last revised April 25, 2007. 
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for the remaining nine communities: Belpre, Bridgeport, Buchtel, Hubbard, Morrow, Murray City, 
North Randall, Port Washington, and Senecaville. The mayors in those communities are 
empowered with the default authorizations from the Ohio Revised Code, a strong-mayor 
system. 
For the mayors of cities (Belpre and Hubbard), the first half of ORC §733.03 is most apposite. 
The mayor shall be the chief conservator of peace within the city. He may appoint and 
remove the director of public service, the director of public safety, and the heads of the 
subdepartments of public service and public safety, and shall have such other powers 
and perform such other duties as are conferred and required by law.  86
For the mayors of villages (Bridgeport, Buchtel, Morrow, Murray City, North Randall, Port 
Washington, and Senecaville), ORC §733.24, controls. 
Such mayor shall be the chief conservator of the peace therein and shall have the 
powers and duties provided by law. He shall be the president of the legislative authority 
and shall preside at all regular and special meetings thereof, but shall have no vote 
except in case of a tie. 
The powers conferred in these strong-mayor systems are strikingly similar to those in ​Ward​. In 
these nine communities and in the system struck down in ​Ward​, the mayor has significant 
executive authorities including being the chief conservator of the peace, presiding over council 
meetings, and overseeing executive functions of the community. Unlike the facts in ​Dugan​ and 
the weak mayor communities detailed above, the mayor, not the city manager, is the chief 
executive. Thus, the mayors in these communities are engaged in two meaningfully different 
positions, one judicial and the other partisan. 
Despite dual-hatted conflicts of interest receiving great attention, they could only arise in these 
fifteen courts. Although fact patterns like that in ​Tumey​ are the most sensational and intuitive 
forms of conflict of interest, they are not the only option. While dual-hatted conflicts of interest 
are impossible for all but fifteen courts, and unlikely for six of those fifteen, other conflicts of 
interest may be denying defendants due process in Ohio’s mayor’s courts. 
Mayor-appointed Magistrates 
Precedents governing conflict of interest allegations in mayor’s courts focus on mayors holding 
both executive and judicial power. While magistrates clearly do not play both a partisan and 
judicial role, that does not mean that they are immune from conflict. After all, the courts also 
held that a process which offers a “possible temptation to the average man as a judge” to tilt the 
balance of justice for the cases before him or her would violate a defendant’s due process 
rights. Magistrates could surely encounter such a temptation. 
Unlike mayors who receive a personal bonus for finding defendants guilty or mayors with broad 
executive authority whose budgets are funded by their court, the magistrate system does not 
pose prima facie structural risks. That said, magistrate arrangements should not be overlooked. 
Despite receiving more discussion and study, mayor-run trials only represented 39.4% of the 
86 Ohio Revised Code §733. 
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1364 mayor’s court cases that actually went to trial in 2017; magistrates oversaw nearly three 
out of every five trials. 
 
Figure 7: Number of Trials Run by a Magistrate in each Mayor’s Court, 2017 
Like any presiding judge, mayor’s court magistrates are influenced by their environment and 
vulnerable to human error. Two main factors, however, make mayor’s courts especially 
susceptible to undetected conflict of interest issues: 
● Intimate System. ​ Intimate communities and professional settings lessen magistrates’ 
independence. State judges are rarely appointed, and when they are, they are far more 
removed from their appointers.  Even Supreme Court Justices, who enjoy the greatest 87
independence from their appointers and strong institutional pressures toward 
independence, show signs of loyalty.  Magistrates overseeing small courts in small 88
communities enjoy little insulation from political pressures. Political pressures are 
compounded when the court’s revenue is critical to the community’s financial health. 
● Limited Transparency.​  Data about what happens in mayor’s courts is sparse, but data 
about what happens behind the scenes is even harder to come by. The lack of 
transparency makes it especially difficult to detect impropriety that the intimacy of the 
environment makes more likely. A magistrate’s contract or relationships could place 
87 A 2012 study found that about 90% of state judges in the United States are elected. In Ohio, nearly all judges are 
elected. Jeri Zeder, “Elected vs. Appointed?” ​Harvard Law Today​, July 1, 2012, 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/book-review/in-new-book-shugerman-explores-the-history-of-judicial-selection-in-the-u-
s/​. 
88 ​Lee Epstein and Eric A. Posner, "Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President," The Journal of Legal Studies 
45, no. 2 (June 2016): 401-436, ​https://doi.org/10.1086/688395​. 
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meaningful pressures on him or her to act in the financial interests of the community 
government without anyone knowing. If magistrates were subject to perverse pressures 
to the point of constituting an unconstitutional (or otherwise unsavory) conflict of interest, 
the public may never know because of mayor’s courts’ opacity.  
The nature of their work environment may expose magistrates to especially robust political 
pressures. Magistrates are likely to face conflicts from two sources: institutional pressures and 
professional pressures. 
Institutional Pressure 
Magistrates serve at the pleasure of the appointing mayor. Their compensation can be a) a fixed 
annual salary set by the legislature of the municipality they serve, b) a different fixed annual 
amount, or c) fees for their services based on a set contract.  This largely unregulated 89
relationship between municipalities and their agents creates a risk that the pressures that would 
subvert a mayor’s judgement are indistinguishable from those magistrates feel. 
The magistrate may face a institutional conflict of interest from two fronts. 
● Official Channels.  State law grants extensive leeway on the types of contracts that 
magistrates receive. In ​Tumey​, the Court knew that the mayor received more 
compensation when convicting defendants, because the compensation arrangement 
was statutorily defined. A defendant before a magistrate, on the other hand, would likely 
have no idea that the presiding judge had pecuniary incentives to convict her. Even if the 
base contract does not inject conflict, performance incentives may. For example, a 
magistrate whose contract’s renewal or bonuses were contingent on raising a certain 
amount of money for the municipality would face pressure to consider factors beyond the 
facts in a given case when deciding whether to convict and considering how to sentence 
the defendant. Since a mayor is authorized to hear cases even after appointing a 
magistrate, a magistrate who gets paid by the session is structurally incentivized to 
decide cases in the mayor’s interest lest the magistrate find himself or herself replaced 
by the mayor, losing out on pay as a result.  90
● Unofficial Channels. Even if corrupting influences are not written into the magistrate’s 
contract, they may still be at hand. The intimate nature of small communities introduces 
the possibility that mayors appoint their close friends, business partners, or other 
associates to the magistrate position. Alternatively, an otherwise neutral magistrate may 
be swayed by pressures to serve the mayor’s political and financial interests by virtue of 
the closeness between the mayor and magistrate. Be it a result of social loyalty, political 
interest, and/or occupational preservation, magistrates with a neutral formal contract 
may still be swayed or appear to be swayed by other impermissible conflicts of interest. 
Appellate courts reviewing mayor’s court procedures and structures have long worried that 
mayors would be moved by pressures other than that of justice, namely money. On the other 
hand, magistrates have largely been assumed to be immune from the pressures a mayor would 
face. While that may be true for many pressures and many magistrates, there are still 
89Ohio Revised Code §1905.05. 
90 These situations have not necessarily arisen, but could. 
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meaningful channels through which the unique facets of mayor’s courts and the communities 
they serve could allow impermissible influence to affect the magistrate.  
Professional Conflicts 
Since mayor’s courts are in session so infrequently, magistrate positions are part-time jobs. 
Part-time judges are subject to more stringent ethical requirements, but many jurisdictions have 
still been forced to confront both conflicts and perceived conflicts of interest that undermine the 
judicial process. Part-time judges who also practice law (as many do) face further ethical 
issues—especially in attempting to keep the two roles distinct.  91
Communities preparing to hire a magistrate should consider that lawyer’s other commitments 
before hiring him or her. More importantly, that information should be shared broadly with the 
community. Since the opportunities for conflict of interest to arise—via institutional pressures or 
professional engagement—exist, magistrates must be acknowledged as a source of potential 
trouble in mayor’s court systems. 
Practitioners and mayor’s court scholars alike need to consider the meaningful possibility of 
magistrate arrangements violating defendants’ due process rights instead of taking the facial 
lack of conflict as the full story. After all, far more defendants face trials presided over by 
magistrates than by mayors. 
Financially-motivated Courts 
Courts have long considered the risk that a municipality’s financial reliance on its mayor’s court 
would lead corrupt it. A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that courts have 
underestimated money’s role in courts throughout the country, especially low-level 
misdemeanor courts. 
Incentives to Generate Revenue 
Concerns about biased trials focus on merely a small tip of the caseload and potential conflict 
icebergs. In reality, most cases never make it to trial. Most potential conflicts arise before trial 
too. 
These potential conflicts are unlike those at trial—where the person deciding the case and 
determining the sentence allegedly make a decision for reasons beyond the record—because 
they cannot necessarily be traced so clearly to a single, key moment in a given case. Rather, 
these are upstream decisions that create a mayor’s court enforcement environment that, on 
average, reaches certain types of people in certain volumes, in certain ways—and for the wrong 
reasons. The worry here is that policymakers and their agents generate revenue at the expense 
of justice. 
We assume that criminal justice policy is made and enacted to maximize public safety, not 
bolster budgets. That assumption is tenuous. The Conference of State Court Administrators 





claims that “courts are not revenue centers.”  They should say, more accurately, that “courts 92
should​ not be revenue centers.” Some mayor’s courts undeniably have become revenue 
centers. The question is just how pervasively courts are being used with the intent to generate 
revenue. 
Mayor’s courts allow communities to collect more revenue than they otherwise would. This 
money, which usually accrues to the community’s general fund, allows community leaders to 
provide services and undertake improvement projects that would otherwise be unaffordable. 
Perhaps more important than the sum of the money that mayor’s courts collect is who provides 
it. While some of a jurisdiction’s taxpayers are brought before the mayor’s court to pay fines and 
fees, many of the people paying in to the mayor’s court pay their taxes elsewhere. In 2006, for 
example, notorious speed trap town North Hampton issued 1,300 tickets, including more to 
motorists from Indiana (13) than from North Hampton (6).  Since a mayor’s court can collect 93
revenue from non-taxpayers, it shifts some of the community’s revenue-providing burden onto 
outsiders. 
 
The electoral incentives are present even when mayor’s courts are charging taxpaying, 
voting members of the community. By dressing up the expense as retribution for illicit 
behavior, mayor’s courts lend legitimacy and political cover to revenue collection that 
would either come from taxpayers or be unavailable to the community’s leaders. 
Together, these two incentives combine strong electoral and community pressures to lean more 
heavily on the mayor’s courts to provide funding than they would a court solely focused on crime 
and justice. Perhaps most alarmingly, mayor’s courts’ limited transparency and negligible 
oversight make it easy for policy-makers to fall victim to these incentives to abuse mayor’s 
courts without anyone noticing. 
92 Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 205. 
93 Village officials suggest that the discrepancy is the result of residents being a small minority of the motorists on the 
main thoroughfares where most of the ticketing is done. Whether intentional or not the North Hampton mayor’s court 
provided its leaders with revenue from 1,294 people who are neither voters nor tax payers. The only other way to get 
that funding would have been to tax voters more. See “Small Town has a Reputation for Handing Out Traffic 




Channels for Money’s Influence 
While the perverse influence of money can arise in any court, the risk of financial pressures 
becoming meaningful conflicts of interest is especially high in smaller ecosystems, like those 
where mayor’s courts operate, for two primary reasons. 
● Limited Formal Separation of Powers.​  Consider a locality in which, a few city council 
members set the court’s jurisdiction, the mayor hires and directs police officers and 
prosecutors, and the same mayor hears cases and decide guilt. Where most court 
officials are further removed from executive and legislative affairs, mayor’s court leaders 
can set enforcement and prosecution practices and then preside over the court that 
decides the outcomes of those enforcements and prosecutions. Rarely does court 
leadership overlap so extensively with the financially-minded elements of a government. 
With mayor’s courts, however, politicians seeking funding are very close to the court and 
broader criminal justice system that can produce it. 
● Significant Funding at Stake.​  Since small communities have a more limited tax base 
than their larger brethren, funds from mayor’s courts often represent a comparatively 
more significant share of the community’s total revenue. When mayor’s court revenues 
are not only large in absolute magnitude, but also relative to a communities’ other 
funding streams, communities become especially reliant on the court and are thus 
especially susceptible to setting justice aside in pursuit of much-needed revenue. 
Communities that know they are dependent on mayor’s court funding will go to great 
lengths to preserve it. 
Once a mayor decides to create a mayor’s court, various actors in the municipality make a 
number of discretionary decisions that shape how the court operates. The decisions at each 
step have profound implications for the amount of revenue the court will generate. 
 
The jurisdiction the court embraces and the way it enforces that jurisdiction determines who is 
drawn into the court process. Unlike most felonies where a victim starts the enforcement 
process, there are a virtually unlimited number of people who can be cited for speeding, 
trespassing, or disorderly behavior—and even more who can be cited for following too closely, 
failure to signal a turn, and barking dogs.  Thus, a more robust enforcement approach will 94
94 All six offenses can be heard in the Enon Mayor’s Court and also carry default bonds of $180 (speeding 1-20 miles 
per hour over the limit), $150 (criminal trespassing and disorderly conduct), $125 (following too closely, failing to 
signal a turn and barking dogs). See Enon Bond Schedule, last modified 2015. 
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necessarily lead to more people entering the court, and, by extension, more revenue for the 
municipality. 
Since many mayor’s courts use violations bureaus to process a large number of citations, many 
cases never reach the third stage: prosecutorial discretion. Even fewer cases, however, are 
affected by trial decisions. Despite most critiques of mayor’s courts focusing on the trial phase of 
judicial decision-making, trials are a rarity in mayor’s courts—as they are in other courts. 
This section highlights potential conflicts of interest that happen before the trial. They affect 
those cases that go to trial, and the much larger balance of the unseen caseloads that never 
make it to the courtroom. 
1. Jurisdiction.​  In defining the nuances of a mayor’s court’s jurisdiction and setting the cost 
schedule, legislators shape the money-making potential of the court from beginning. 
2. Enforcement​.  As executive branch leaders set enforcement policy and culture, they 
determine the rate at which civilians are cited and arrested—the shared entry point for 
mayor’s court defendants. 
3. Prosecution​.​ ​ Tasked with checking over-policing and bringing charges, prosecutors are 
charged with preventing abuse. Mayor’s courts frequently limit or eliminate prosecutors 
and the safeguards they provide. 
For some municipalities, deciding to create a mayor’s court is principally a financial decision.  95
For others, the lure of easy money comes later. If the obsession with money begins, it is difficult 
to shake. Money’s corruptive influence emerges in all three phases of pre-trial decisions. 
Jurisdiction 
State law provides a general framework for mayor’s court jurisdictions. But the way in which the 
municipality’s legislature fills in the details can lead to disparate outcomes. Legislatures have 
two primary avenues to influence the amount of money the mayor’s court generates, where it 
goes, and who pays it. 
● Passing Ordinances​.  A large portion of a mayor’s court’s jurisdiction comes from 
municipal ordinances. Thus, in determining what behavior is outlawed by municipal 
ordinances, community legislatures have significant control over what cases can come 
before a mayor’s court. Legislatures can prohibit otherwise licit behavior; they can also 
proscribe behavior already barred by state law. Making the behavior illicit with a 
municipal ordinance allows the mayor’s court to hear cases about that behavior and 
retain the fines collected from those convicted of violating that ordinance. 
 
Municipal ordinances need not widen the mayor’s courts’ net evenly. While many cases 
in mayor’s courts involve common behavior, other types of “crimes” are 
disproportionately committed by certain types of people. By criminalizing certain activity, 
the legislature can—even inadvertently—punish those who are more likely to engage in 
that activity. The disparate effect of criminal behavior is seen most prominently in laws 




that “punish poverty.” Laws against trespassing, camping, loitering, and begging, for 
example, criminalize nearly everything someone without a home does. 
 
● Setting Court Fines and Fees​.  Many courts are feeling financial pains from their broad 
criminalization efforts. Too many cases for poor people’s picayune behavior lead to 
expensive jail sentences and many unpaid fines. Mayor’s courts are unique, because 
they rarely jail defendants and frequently collect the fines they charge. While collection 
rates are certainly not 100%, mayor’s courts are more profitable than similar courts, 
many of which end up costing their communities’ money. 
 
As a result of higher revenue rates, setting fines and fees is an especially relevant 
component of the mayor’s court ATM process. Its significance is further compounded by 
the large share of cases that are paid out. Rather than dealing with the hassle of 
contesting a case or even going into court to negotiate a plea deal, defendants can 
simple pay online or mail a check to the mayor’s court and settle the case at a fixed rate. 
Paying out is easier and also generally less expensive since it allows the defendant to 
avoid paying court costs. Especially when mayor’s court revenue composes as 
significant a role in a community’s budget as it does for many Ohio communities, it is 
hard to believe that earnings potential does not, at the very least, tempt legislators when 
determining the fines and fees their community will charge. 
The legislature’s ability to widen the net of possible cases its mayor’s court can hear and to set 
default fines and fees for defendants convicted in those cases gives it a significant role in 
determining how much revenue a mayor’s court will produce. While the executive manages the 
budget and reports back to the legislature, it is the legislature who passes the laws that truly 
define the mayor’s court’s jurisdiction and ultimately controls the community’s pursestrings. 
Although a legislature determining the revenue-setting capacity of a court is hardly unique to 
mayor’s courts, smaller mayor’s court communities may exacerbate money’s corrupting 
influence. 
Enforcement 
Most municipalities criminalize behavior so broadly that virtually the entire population could be 
cited or arrested in the course of going about their normal business.  So-called “quality of life” 96
crimes are prevalent enough that they are also described as the “power of arrest.”  Police 97
departments, which in strong-mayor governments without magistrates report to the same person 
who runs the mayor’s court, are the the front-line operatives influencing the amount of cash that 
will flow to a mayor’s court. 
Even if ordinary officers do not consider their department’s budget while patrolling the streets, 
financial considerations can still shape their work.  By creating quotas, citation-heavy cultures, 98
or other performance measures that incentivize arrests and citations, police leadership and their 
96 Stephen L. Carter, “Law Puts Us All in Same Danger as Eric Garner,” ​Bloomberg​, December 4, 2014, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-12-04/law-puts-us-all-in-same-danger-as-eric-garner​. 
97 Post Editorial Board, “Why ‘Quality of Life’ Offenses Must Remain Crimes,” ​New York Post​, April 27, 2015, 
https://nypost.com/2015/04/27/why-quality-of-life-offenses-must-remain-crimes/​. 
98 It is important to remember that small-town police departments are little like their big-city counterparts with legions 
of recruits and complex hierarchies. Some police departments consist of a few part-time officers, blurring the line 
between department leader and beat officer. 
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political bosses can increase the flow of defendants into the mayor’s court and, by extension, 
revenue for the community (much of which often returns to their own budget).  99
The Richfield Mayor’s Court, for example, demonstrates how police priorities shape court 
revenue. Case numbers were more than halved between 2006 and 2007, a change Police Chief 
Keith Morgan attributed to fewer available officers, a mild winter, and the department’s 
increased focus on dealing with neighborhood calls instead of traffic enforcement.  For police 100
officers surrounded by technically illicit behavior, organizational pressure to create more cases 
will get results. 
Financial incentives for overzealous policing hijacks the role of the police. Police are forced to 
pursue money alongside, or, in some cases, ahead of justice and safety. Rather than being 
enforcers of order, they become fundraisers. This corruption of the police is, of course, not 
unique to mayor’s courts. While mayor’s courts may be marginally more susceptible to these 
problems since they exist in such intimate environments, getting rid of mayor’s courts will 
certainly not eliminate the influence that money can and often exert over the police. 
Further, police departments can often decide whether to issue charges for a state offense or a 
municipal offense. Fines from the former primarily go to the state while a much larger share of 
the fines from the former go to the community. Even beyond choosing whom to cite or arrest, 
police can and do increase the community’s revenue by choosing how they cite or arrest 
someone. 
Prosecution 
Prosecutors exercise wide discretion and are often considered the most powerful player in a 
court system.  In deciding what charges to bring and how to do so, they serve as a key check 101
against unfounded or otherwise illegitimate cases. After the police arrest someone, prosecutors 
generally make the decision on whether to “decline” the case and end the process before it 
goes any further. Alternatively, the prosecutor can issue charges, beginning the criminal 
process and making the arrestee a defendant. 
The two-step verification process before a case begins can be weakened or eliminated in 
mayor’s courts by a combination of the following three factors: 
● Less Prosecutorial Independence​.  When the mayor is the chief executive of the 
community, he or she is also the prosecutor’s boss. The close relationships common 
among political leaders in small communities prevents mayor’s court prosecutors from 
enjoying the same degree of insulation from political pressures that other prosecutors 
enjoy. The close ties allow mayoral and/or councilor desires to increase community 
revenues via the mayor’s court to more readily affect the prosecutor’s decisions. 
Revenue should be the last thing on a prosecutor’s mind when evaluating whether or not 
to bring a case, but when the mayor’s office is trying to increase its funds (or has already 
99 Arrest and citation rates can also determine officers’ ability to get raises or promotions in some police departments. 
See Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 232. 
100 Rick Armon, “Cuyahoga Falls Mayor’s Court Bustling, But Numbers Statewide Fall,” ​The Akron Beacon Journal, 
July 30, 2012, 
https://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9VIV000400&an=KRTAK00020120730e87u00031&c
at=a&ep=ASI ​. 
101 Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 66.. 
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budgeted for a certain income from its mayor’s court), prosecutors may fall to the siren 
song of fiscal realities when evaluating cases. 
● Additional Pressure to Plead.​  Plea bargains—in which the defendant faces significant 
pressure to plead guilty—are a common trial alternative throughout U.S. courts. The 
dangers of plea bargaining, well documented elsewhere, may be exacerbated in mayor’s 
courts where the prosecutor works for the mayor, works closely with the magistrate, or 
has other connections that make going to trial a surefire win. The defendant may also 
conclude that the trial’s outcome is preordained. Additionally, some mayor’s courts do 
not conduct trials. In those cases, defendants have to choose pleading guilty—and 
potentially only suffering what seem like relatively minor sanctions—or asserting their 
innocence and enduring the case hanging over them as they enter a new court and 
process at a later date once their case gets transferred to the local municipal or county 
court. 
● Absent Prosecutors.​  Some mayor’s courts lack prosecutors altogether. In those 
situations, there is no prosecutorial discretion, which means that no one is reviewing the 
police’s decision to decide whether or not to bring a case. For example, a 2016 observer 
of the Yellow Springs Mayor’s Court reported a court session with only three others in 
the room: then-mayor Dave Foubert, presiding, the police officer who issued the citation 
and discussed the facts in the sentencing phase, and an unnamed defendant who pled 
guilty to driving under suspension, claiming he lacked the resources to reinstate his 
license.  Removing a critical safety valve from the conviction process means that any 102
policing errors—induced by rent-seeking, arrest-heavy quotas, for example—will pass 
through unchecked.  103
The Supreme Court has reflected that the prosecutor’s interest is “not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.”  Prosecutors may lose sight of that interest when 104
their boss wants to use the convictions they generate to raise funds, but it is certainly 
lost when prosecutors are removed from the situation entirely. Other courts separate 
police officers’ citing discretion and prosecutors’ prosecutorial discretion for a reason. In 
certain South Carolina courts, for example, defendants have been found almost three 
times more likely to plead guilty or no contest when confronted by a police 
officer-prosecutor than when facing anyone else (or even nobody).  105
With strong incentives for key mayor’s court players to be swayed by the perverse incentive to 
maximize revenue and ample opportunities for those unsavory influences to infiltrate the 
102 Yellow Springs uses a council-manager form of government, meaning the mayor has negligible executive power. 
He or she does not even have a vote on the council. If the mayor did also serve as the chief executive, he or she 
would be the police officer’s boss several times removed. For mayor’s power, see ​Charter of Yellow Springs, Ohio, 
Article III, §29​. 
For story, see Dylan Taylor-Lehman, “How Mayor’s Courts Work,” ​Yellow Springs News​, February, 4, 2016, 
https://ysnews.com/news/2016/02/how-mayors-court-works ​. 
103 This structural omission is not unique to mayor’s courts, but can also be found in select low-level courts throughout 
the country. Courtrooms in South Carolina, New Mexico, and New Hampshire feature police officers doing double 
duty as prosecutors and witnesses. That means that defendants oftentimes work out plea deals with the same officer 
who arrested them and chose to file charges. See: Alexandra Natapoff, ​Punishment Without Crime​ (New York: Basic 
Books, 2018), 71. 
104 ​Berger v. United States​, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
105 Alisa Smith, et. al., “Rush to Judgement: How South Carolina’s Summary Courts Fail to Protect Constitutional 
Rights, ​National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers​, 2017, https://www.nacdl.org/RushToJudgement/. 
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process of justice, there is a large risk that certain mayor’s courts take their eye off justice or, 
worse, that their vision is clouded by the prospect of fundraising success. While community 
officials may not intend to make such a tradeoff or even realize the implications of doing so, 
benevolent ignorance is little consolation for those who have to pay what amount to extra taxes 
under guise of reconciling criminality, safety, and justice. 
Evidence of Money’s Influence 
Financial factors weigh heavily on court leaders’ minds. While the theories above suggest that 
money is more influential than the evidence proves, that is to be expected. Despite the limited 
data availability, several courts have produced clear records of financially-motivated operations.  
Brice, Ohio demonstrates the theory perfectly: it became dependent on money from its mayor’s 
court and sacrificed justice to sustain that funding.  As soon as funding that was once 106
dependable is threatened, communities realize how much they have come to depend on it. 
When the Ohio legislature forbade mayor’s courts in communities with fewer than 100 residents, 
Mayor David Welling kept the Brice Mayor’s Court open anyways. His defiance persisted even 
after receiving notice that his court was not allowed.  That was the Summer of 2003.  107
In 2004, the Brice Mayor’s Court (operating without jurisdiction) posted Ohio’s fifth-highest ticket 
rate: about 7.6 tickets per resident. Those 529 tickets funded 40% of the village’s court and 
part-time police department costs, a critical portion of the village’s less-than-$120,000 budget.  108
The mayor’s court seemed to be funding a police force whose primary job was fundraising, for 
itself. 
Citing his own records, Mayor Welling claimed that Brice had 122 residents. The 2000 census 
counted 70. The facially simple dispute over how many people lived in Brice took nearly three 
years to resolve, allowing the illicit mayor’s court operate until 2006. Most defendants convicted 
during those years had no way to reverse convictions that, again, were secured in a court 
without jurisdiction. These people, like so many others, had waived their rights upon accepting 
plea deals and paying out. 
Local powerbrokers opposed the closure. Mayor Welling lamented how out of touch state 
legislators were: “They was (sic) born with a spoon in their mouth and they forget about the little 
people. Leave us alone.”  He also argued that Brice’s two part-time police officers were 109
needed to keep residents safe beyond the sporadic support the local sheriff provided. 
One might question how much protecting the police officers did when they were so busy issuing 
fundraising tickets, but that overlooks the deeper problem: communities depend on court 
106 While some communities are better able to withstand financial pressures, and larger communities with more 
diverse funding sources face less pressure, most courts face at least some pressure. After all, every initiative funded 
by mayor’s court revenue would need alternative resources if the court closed or caseloads fell. 
107 Mayor Welling has no legal background and worked primarily in construction—a classic example of mayors 
running a court, hearing arguments from a trained prosecutor, and deciding cases with no legal background. See 
Stephen Majors, “Mayor’s Courts on Another Quest to Survive the Law,” ​Associated Press Newswires​, September 
23, 2007, https://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070923e39n002mj&cat=a&ep=ASE. 
108 “Central Ohio Village Eliminates Mayor’s Courts,” ​Associated Press Newswires​, May 4, 2006, 
https://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020060504e254001bb&cat=a&ep=ASE. 
109 Stephen Majors, “Mayor’s Courts on Another Quest to Survive the Law,” ​Associated Press Newswires​, September 
23, 2007, .https://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070923e39n002mj&cat=a&ep=ASE. 
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revenues to fund core services. Faced with losing their court, Brice considered raising the local 
income tax from 1% to 2%—a politically dangerous proposal. What mayor would prefer to raise 
taxes on residents (and voters) when the same funds could be readily generated under the 
guise of promoting safety? 
The Ohio Municipal League agreed, arguing that abolishing mayor’s courts would take police 
officers off the street—a compelling talking point for tough-on-crime politicians. Their pro-court 
rhetoric reveals two troubling realities: mayor’s courts provide a core funding pipeline and 
politicians are acutely aware of that. 
Population growth before the 2010 census allowed the Brice Mayor’s Court to return—only to 
get eliminated again when the new 200-person population floor went into effect in March of 
2013. Brice made the most of its mayor’s court while it lasted, raising $104,000 of its $135,000 
budget in 2012.  110
Within two months of losing the mayor’s court again, the community and its now one-member 
police department had a new judicial fundraising process. By July 2013, it was running a robust 
civil violation system. Ticketed motorists could choose to pay out, challenge the charge at 
monthly administrative hearings, request a separate hearing with the village’s law director, 
demand the case be transferred to Franklin County, or get turned over to a credit bureau. 
Not only was the civil violation system suspect, but so were the sums charged. Some of the 
fines Brice created for traffic violations exceeded $750, far above the base fine under Ohio or 
Columbus law of $97.  For expired tags alone, the ​average​ ticket in Brice was $750.  Others 111 112
of the thousands of citations were for as much as $1,500. While transferring may be wise for 
defendants facing large fines, others, like Consuela Floyd who got her $75 dollar ticket for a 4% 
window tint dismissed in Franklin County, just end up paying more. Despite winning and not 
having to pay $75 to Brice, she paid $90 in court costs for the appeal.  113
Brice’s civil violation system was only banned in 2016, despite the Brice prosecutor defending 
its “good intentions.”  Franklin County Municipal Judge Michael T. Brandt, on the other hand, 114
noted that the system seemed “like a way to circumvent the law to keep the money influx into 
the community.”   115
Most troubling is how easily both comments are reconciled. The community leaders’ good 
intentions ​were ​to keep money flowing into the community. It allowed them to continue the basic 
services residents had come to depend on. Allowing communities to profit so directly from 
courts creates potent and perverse incentives to lean on those courts—even circumventing the 
law if necessary—to fund the communities’ needs. 
110 Rex Santus, “Linndale, Other Villages Thwarted in Effort to Save Mayor’s courts,” ​The Plain Dealer​, March 20, 
2013, ​https://www.cleveland.com/open/2013/03/linndale_other_villages_thwart.html​. 
111 “Bill Would Restrict Some Ohio Villages’ Ticketing Practices,” ​Associated Press Newswires​, November 26, 2015, 
https://global.factiva.com/ga/default.aspx ​. 
112 “Ohio House Passes Bill to Curb ‘Abusive’ Traffic Ticketing,” ​Associated Press Newswires​, April 17, 2016, 
https://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020160417ec4h005my&cat=a&ep=ASE. 






Brice is hardly alone in its heavy reliance on mayor’s court revenue.  When another 
116
community’s court was threatened, it passed a resolution protesting that the closure “may cause 
such reduction in revenue to this village that an additional burden may result in increased 
taxation and/or curtailment of services essential to the health, welfare and safety of this village.”
 117
Even mayor’s courts run by magistrates can create financial dependencies. The magistrate-run 
North Hampton Mayor’s Court, for example, generated $135,697 in revenue in 2011—more 
than sixty-percent of the village’s general fund.  Much of that money sustained the police 
118
department, meaning that if police officers failed to issue enough citations and the court failed to 
issue enough convictions, the police department would be forced to downsize or even close its 
doors. Given its small population, 478 in the 2010 census, North Hampton relies on non-tax 
revenue to provide expensive community services.  
119
Records of other community officials intentionally pursuing money at the expense of justice 
would surely be condemning. Far less sensational evidence, however, should also be sufficient 
to cast serious doubt over the system. Communities’ dependence on court revenue and their 
demonstrated commitment to sustain it, highlights how influential money actually is in Ohio’s 
mayor’s courts.  At the very least, it is clear that the pursuit of revenue creates an impression 120
of impropriety. 
Conclusion 
The mayor’s courts the Supreme Court reviewed in 1927 and the world in which they operated 
are very different from those today. Roads have improved, transportation has quickened, and 
Ohio’s population has grown. While the “backcountry” may once have needed to rely on judges 
without legal training, there is no such dearth of lawyers eager to serve today. 
As the world changes, we must critically evaluate both the normative judgements that were 
made decades ago and the assumptions that justified them. As the Court reasoned in ​Tumey​: 
It is, of course,​ so common ​to vest the mayor of villages with inferior judicial functions 
that the mere union of the executive power and the judicial power in him can not be said 
to violate due process of law. The minor penalties usually attaching to the ordinances of 
a village council, or to the misdemeanors in which the mayor may pronounce final 
judgment without a jury, ​do not involve any such addition to the revenue of the 
116 John F. Pfiffner, “The Mayor’s Court and Due Process,” ​Iowa Law Review ​12, no. 4 (1927): 393-405, 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ilr12&div=35&id=&page=. 
117 John J. Chernoski, “The ‘Right’ to a Neutral and Competent Judge in Ohio’s Mayor’s Courts,” 
https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/69638/OSLJ_V36N4_0889.pdf 
118 Michael Cooper, “Mayor’s Courts Lucrative—and Controversial,” ​Springfield News-Sun​, June 23, 2012, 
https://www.springfieldnewssun.com/news/crime—law/mayor-courts-lucrative-and-controversial/SDgnazv0OHZ3IBto
eHGzFI/. 
119 North Hampton’s population (478) being larger than usual for prominent financially-dependent communities, mayor 
and lifelong resident Emory Harrod calls the mayor’s court revenue “vital” to the police department continuing to run. 
See Ibid. 





village​ as to justify the fear that the mayor would be influenced in his judicial judgment 
by that fact.  121
The absence of inter-branch checks and balances creates an environment ripe for conflict of 
interest: the mayor oversees the police department that charges defendants, the court that 
adjudicates those charges, and the budget that benefits from guilty verdicts. Unlike the 1920s, 
vesting the mayor with inferior judicial functions is not “so common.” Neither can we reasonably 
conclude that mayor’s court cases do not involve enough money to “justify the fear that the 
mayor would be influenced in his judicial judgement by that fact.” 
In sum, money is part of many decisions in many mayor’s courts. Even when defendants pay 
out or plead guilty, their perceptions of a deck stacked against them undermines mayor’s courts’ 
legitimacy. Seeing the political fervor behind keeping mayor’s courts, knowing how important 
case revenue is to those collecting it, and accepting the close social ties among the community 
elites running the show, defendants have plenty of reason to question whether or not they are 
receiving a fair shake or just experiencing a shake down. That doubt alone is enough to 
mandate an improved system.  122
Disparate Effect 
The criminal justice system in general falls disproportionately harshly on people of color.  123
Mayor’s courts’ informality and flexibility, coupled with their lack of transparency and oversight 
make them ​especially ​prone to hosting undetected institutionalized racism. The juvenile justice 
system also has heightened informality and flexibility, which researchers have traced to an 
increased potential for abuse of discretion.  
124
National statistics have shown that drivers of color are more likely to be pulled over than white 
drivers, despite being no more likely to break traffic laws.  After getting pulled over, people of 
125
color are also more likely to be issued a citation. For example, after being pulled over for 
speeding, Hispanic drivers are thirty percent more likely to get a ticket than white drivers, while 
121 ​Tumey v. Ohio​, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
122 As the Supreme Court notes, “the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the 
argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it no [sic] without danger of 
injustice” ( ​Tumey v. Ohio​, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). Likewise the mere possibility that a system could function justly 
should not be the standard by which we determine what needs to be reformed. Systems that rely on being run by the 
greatest and most just among us are hardly sustainable. It is difficult to say what level of attenuation is sufficient, but 
current levels of conflict are clearly inappropriate. 
123 Radley Balko, “There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal-Justice System is Racist. Here’s the Proof,” ​The 
Washington Post ​, September 18, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-that-the-criminal-justi
ce-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/​. 
124 American Sociological Association, ​Department of Research and Development, Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal 
Justice System ​, September 2007, 10, 
http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/images/press/docs/pdf/ASARaceCrime.pdf ​. 
125 Christopher Ingraham, “You Really Can Get Pulled Over for Driving While Black, Federal Statistics Show,” ​The 
Washington Post ​, September 9, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/09/you-really-can-get-pulled-over-for-driving-while-black-fed
eral-statistics-show/?utm_term=.09fc548ba98​. See also Michael A. Fletcher, “For Black Motorists, a Never-ending 




black drivers are twenty percent more likely than white drivers to have the same result.  Some 
126
studies even allude to the police officers’ intent, including a 2017 study in Connecticut that found 
that police disproportionately pull over black and Hispanic drivers during daylight hours—when 
they can more easily see the race of the driver.  Together, these studies clearly suggest that 
127
people of color may enter the mayor’s court system at a disproportionate rate.  With limited 
128
prosecutorial checks, police errors can quickly become court errors. 
Further, the wide-ranging discretion and lack of oversight enjoyed by the presiding officer of 
mayor’s courts gives plenty of room for implicit bias to enter the process unnoticed and 
unchecked. Unnoticed categorical assumptions can have a profound effect on a decision 
maker’s analysis.  When it comes to criminality, those assumptions are racially charged, 
129
tending to link black people with crime.  In other words, once the presiding officer sees the 
130
defendant’s race, implicit racism will almost certainly influence his or her decisions on both guilt 
and sentencing. While other court systems employ transparency, oversight, and multiple 
decision makers to mitigate the risk of implicit bias’s harm, mayor’s courts do not. Since other 
court systems have been shown to be affected by implicit bias despite those safeguards, 
mayor’s courts are especially vulnerable.  
131
Mayor’s courts generally only sentence defendants to pay relatively small fines, but for people of 
limited means—who are disproportionately people of color—those fees can escalate quickly.  
132
In mayor’s courts, being wealthy makes cases far easier to handle; impecunious defendants can 
face jail time.  As these outstanding debts accumulate and grow, entire subsets of the 
133
population can be crippled.  That was the situation in Ferguson, Missouri, where the Justice 
134
Department concluded African American residents were unlawfully targeted for fines for the 
purpose of generating revenue rather than public safety interests.  While Ferguson’s injustices 
135
came to light only after significant tragedy, they would be even harder to detect in a mayor’s 
court system. Given the potential societal costs that lurking racial injustice in the mayor’s court 
126 Stanford Open Policing Project, “Findings,” 2018, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/. 
127 Matthew B. Ross, et. al., “State of Connecticut Traffic Stop Data Analysis and Findings, 2015-2016,” ​Racial 
Profiling Prohibition Project ​, November 2017, 
http://www.ctrp3.org/app/download/766619976/November+2017+Connecticut+Racial+Profiling+Report.pdf. 
128 Other arbitrators have found these and similar studies less compelling. Judge Ivan L.R. Memelle recently 
dismissed a 2017 suit brought in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging that the mayor’s 
court in Gretna targets African Americans and the poor for financial gain. See Sandra Lane “Judge Rejects Class 
Action Lawsuit Against Mayor’s Court of Gretna,” ​Louisiana Record​, October 4, 2018, 
https://louisianarecord.com/stories/511586561-judge-rejects-class-action-lawsuit-against-mayor-s-court-of-gretna. 
129 Andrew J. Wistrich and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making How it Affects Judgement 
and What Judges Can Do About It,” ​Cornel Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-16​, March 16, 2017, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2951400_code43904.pdf?abstractid=2934295&mirid=1&type=2. 
130 Anna Roberts, “Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment and the 
Fight against Implicit Stereotyping,” ​The University of Chicago Law Review ​83, no. 2 (2016): 835-891. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Mike Maciag, “Skyrocketing Court Fines Are Major Revenue Generator for Ferguson, ​Governing​, August 22, 2014, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-ferguson-missouri-court-fines-budget.html.  
133 Kala Kachmar, “Municipal Courts Slam the Poor Hardest,” ​Asbury Park Press​, December 9, 2016, 
https://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/government/2016/12/09/municipal-courts-hit-poor-hardest/9
4735926/. 
134 Betsey Bruce, “Court Study Shows Fines Weigh Heavily on Towns with Larger African American Population,” ​Fox 
2 St. Louis ​, October 15, 2014, 
https://fox2now.com/2014/10/15/study-many-north-st-louis-county-towns-balance-budgets-with-court-fees/. 




system could create and the high likelihood that it exists, further investigation is urgently 
needed. 
Prior research on other facets of the criminal justice system and the theoretical frameworks they 
created all suggest that the mayor’s court system disproportionately harms people of color, but 
there has been no thorough examination of unfair treatment in Ohio’s mayor’s courts.  The 
136
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recently conducted a cursory study on the topic, offering 
some preliminary support for claims of racial discrimination.  A follow-up study confirmed many 
137
initial fears: mayor’s courts, especially through failure to appear warrants and license 
suspensions, disproportionately harm people of color and those who cannot afford pay the price 
of admission to meaningful mayor’s court plea-bargaining.  138
Critics allege that most mayor’s courts only exist for their ability to generate revenue for the 
community.  In courts facing strong incentives to fundraise, wealthy defendants have a clear 139
advantage. The court wants money and the defendants want their cases to disappear—the 
sooner the better. Trying to avoid license points, keep a clean criminal record, or stay on track 
for an elite college education inspires defendants to sacrifice more than they otherwise would. 
Oftentimes, the easiest sacrifice is to pay more money—a win-win for cash-hungry courts and 
relief-desperate defenders. 
Prosecutors, for example, commonly allow defendants to plead guilty to a lesser traffic 
violations, avoiding points on their licenses or other unsavory sanctions in exchange to paying 
more in court fines or fees.  Similarly, sanctions for operating a vehicle under the influence are 140
reportedly often reduced in exchange for paying a larger fine.  Reduced charges keep records 
141
clean and futures bright, but that second chance is only available to those who can afford it. 
Regrettably, these racist and classist policies are hardly unique to mayor’s courts. While they 
are likely to arise in mayor’s courts, as they do in all other types of courts, further research is 
needed to definitively identify where inequalities arise in which courts. Even as that research is 
developed, practitioners must acknowledge that injustices may exist outside the traditional 
conflict of interest complaints. Mayor’s courts are especially vulnerable since transparency and 
oversight are so limited. To date, their opacity has focused scholars and reformers alike on 
other, more obvious concerns. 
136 Peter Krouse, “ACLU Analysis of 14 Mayor’s Courts Finds Evidence of Bias and Profiteering,” ​Cleveland.com​, 
August 15, 2018, https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2018/08/aclu_analysis_of_14_mayors_cou_1.html. 
137 “Mayor’s Courts Maps,” ​ACLU Ohio​ 2018, https://www.acluohio.org/mayorscourts/maps. 
138 “Off the Record: Profiteering and Misconduct in Ohio’s Mayor’s Courts,” ​ACLU Ohio​, April 2019, 
https://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Report_OffTheRecordProfiteeringAndMisconductInOhiosMayo
rsCourts_FINAL_2019-0415.pdf ​. 
139 Mike Cunnington, “Unfair Ohio Mayor’s Courts Favor Defendants Who Can Pay,” ​Cleveland.com​, December 9, 
2016, https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/12/unfair_ohio_mayors_courts_skir.html. 
140 See, for example, James Tramel’s 2014 experience in Woodville, Ohio. Ryan Dunn, “Welcome to Woodville: 
You’re Busted,” ​Toledo Blade​, February 8, 2015, 
https://www.toledoblade.com/Police-Fire/2015/02/08/Welcome-to-Woodville-You-re-busted.html ​. 





It is not a coincidence that mayor’s courts are far more profitable than their counterparts. By 
disproportionately handling quick, simple, and inexpensive cases, mayor’s courts keep costs 
low. Mayor’s courts tend to operate less frequently and with lower overhead expenses than 
other courts. With smaller, more standardized dockets, no jury trials, and negligible 
record-keeping obligations, mayor’s courts avoid or reduce many of the expenses that other 
courts face. 
Perhaps more importantly, mayor’s courts have greater discretion over their docket. If cases or 
classes of cases become more hassle than they are worth, mayor’s courts are free to punt them 
to their county or municipal court, which enjoy no such buck-passing privilege. 
In essence, mayor’s courts get the first pass at many cases, take those that are the easiest and 
most profitable, and stick the costly cases on downstream courts. Mayor’s courts thereby “skim” 
choice cases off the top.  The skimming effect highlights how deeply ingrained the pursuit of 142
money is in the calculations community leaders make when thinking about their courts. Indeed, 
case selection points out, once again, the nefarious effects of the large sums at stake, some 
communities’ heavy-reliance on court revenue, and the extensive capacity leaders have to 
influence revenue outcomes of their mayor’s court. 
Debates around skimming provide an unusually transparent view into how important money is 
for mayor’s courts and how much it weights on the minds of court decision-makers. 
While the extent of skimming varies from court to court, it is hard to imagine a mayor’s 
court-municipal court or mayor’s court-county court relationship that does not suffer from 
skimming to some extent. Mayor’s courts’ design ensures that only outlier courts would fail to be 
more profitable, by virtue of skimming, than their downstream counterparts. After all, mayor’s 
courts are legally prohibited from handling many of the more expensive criminal justice 
processes. This leech-like arrangement violates a fundamental sense of fairness among 
communities and their courts. 
The unfairness of skimming is troubling, but the painful realities it exposes about money in 
mayor’s courts are more alarming still. Many court leaders have shown themselves to be acutely 
aware of the money they can collect from mayor’s courts and how their decisions and other 
factors affect that funding. However, what is on the record may be just the tip of the iceberg of 
financial considerations some, if not many, of the people making decisions about mayor’s courts 
and communities’ budgets make. At the very least, we must consider the risk that money’s 
influence is far more significant and pervasive than many assume. While we cannot know what 
lies below the waterline, recent research on other courts, especially misdemeanor courts, 
suggests that it is ominous.  143
142 In doing so, courts act like police officers who choose to write citations but eschew felony arrests and the 
bureaucratic burdens they bring. See Peter Moskos, ​Cop in the Hood ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 




Exploring the accuracy of mayor’s court critiques reveals a less discussed problem: opacity. The 
lack of information about mayor’s courts makes it challenging to prove specific cases of 
misbehavior. 
Mayor’s courts’ have structural risks and opportunities, and sometimes those structural features 
are problematic. Most problems, however, are the result of discretionary decisions a certain 
court makes. Aggregated state data and opaque local processes are insufficient to monitor 
potentially severe abuse.  Only by increasing transparency can mayor’s courts maintain 144
legitimacy and the public’s faith that they truly are operating as they should. 
Although it may seem ironic at first blush, acknowledging mayor’s courts’ problems and their 
causes can demonstrate that they are not irremediable; far from it. It would be a mistake to give 
up on a system about which we know so little, for in doing so we would forego the considerable 
potential it holds for citizens. 
  
144 Most mayor’s court data comes from an annual report from the Ohio Supreme Court, which only shows high-level 
data across courts. Each mayor’s court is presented as an interchangeable part, when in reality some mayor’s courts 
operate very differently from the rest. The limited data sharing leads to a lack of individual contextualization, which 
does mayor’s courts a major disservice. For example, the Chagrin Falls Mayor’s Court has one of the highest transfer 
rates in the data set. At first that looks highly suspicious, but upon recognizing that it does not hold a full court, the 





Justice As It Could Be: Flexible, 
Personal, & Convenient 
Contrary to common caricatures, mayor’s courts can provide meaningful benefits. Their broad 
discretion creates opportunities for flexibility, personalization, and mercy that are harder to come 
by in other courts, even similar, “near-peer” local courts. 
Like most alleged problems in mayor’s courts, their benefits are often cited without proof. It is 
critical to note that all mayor’s courts have the potential to produce significant benefits (even if 
they do not currently outweigh the costs) and that some do. If reformed, far more mayor’s courts 
could deliver similar benefits. 
Two main groups benefit from mayor’s courts. 
● Government​.  As we have seen, city governments and their leaders receive critical 
funding streams from mayor’s courts. These benefits help governments better serve their 
people and help leaders achieve their political ambitions. The benefits governments and 
politicians receive gives them a strong incentive to keep mayor’s courts open. 
● Court users.​  While user benefits are not as robust as some promoters suggest, they do 
exist. Mayor’s courts are often more convenient and can be more personalized and more 
flexible than other courts. The best mayor’s courts provide defendants a less onerous 
judicial experience and a greater senses of procedural justice. 
Other actors may benefit from mayor’s courts—non-court users who enjoy a safer community, 
for example—but the benefits they receive are beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Government Benefits 
Money is such a problem for mayor’s courts because they increase communities’ profits so 
much. After all, the danger is not the money itself, but rather the chance that mayor’s court 
stakeholders are bastardizing the courts’ leverage over society to fill their coffers rather than 
focusing on promoting justice and safety. 
Beyond shifting the community’s financial burden from exclusively taxpayers to taxpayers and 
court defendants, mayor’s courts also increase government’s total revenue and decrease their 
operating costs. 
Revenue-Increasing 
When a defendant pays a fine, that money is split among a variety of eager stakeholders. Who 
gets how much, however, is determined by the type of charge and the court that is collecting. By 
citing defendants with violating municipal ordinances in a mayor’s court, rather than charging 
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them under a state statute, communities claim revenue they would not otherwise receive. In 
other words, creating a mayor’s court ensures that a community will receive a bigger piece of 
the correctional pie. 
Mayor’s court funding allows community leaders to provide services and fund programs that 
would otherwise require unpopular tax dollars. In other words, mayor’s court let community 
leaders spend more and shift a large part of the added bill to outsiders rather than voters. Even 
when mayor’s courts charge residents, community leaders are shielded from political costs. 
Police departments are often even bigger beneficiaries of mayor’s court revenue. Police 
budgets are often the foremost recipient of mayor’s court support with departments receiving 
resources to round out, or in some cases, fully sustain their budgets. Many police departments 
rely on court revenue to pay salaries and purchase big-ticket items like squad cars. Depending 
so heavily on revenue generated downstream of their arrests and citations creates incentivizes 
over-policing. 
Launching a mayor’s court unlocks a whole new realm of funding that, based on other decisions 
about the court, can be quite significant. Those sometimes immense sums provide community 
leaders a strong incentive to fight to keep mayor’s courts and police departments incentives to 
keep them humming. For better or worse, mayor’s courts undeniably provide their operators’ 
with more revenue than they would otherwise have. 
Cost-Saving 
Mayor’s courts are much less expensive to operate than municipal or county courts, which 
handle complex cases, require large staffs and overhead, and sit more frequently. By adding a 
mayor’s court, however, communities can still save money even if they were never footing the 
bill for a municipal or county court. 
Police officers spend an appreciable amount of their time in court, which can be an expensive 
endeavor. Using a mayor’s court instead provides police departments two general cost-saving 
opportunities. 
● Less Frequent Appearances.  ​Since many mayor’s court cases pay out without even 
negotiating a plea deal, police officers do not have to make court appearances for most 
cases. Further, the intimate connection between the mayor’s court and police 
departments reduces the risk that an officer shows up in court only to find out that the 
trial was pled out, continued, or otherwise did not require the officer’s presence. With 
mayor’s courts only sitting a few times a month, officers can handle all their few 
remaining cases at once. 
● Less Costly Appearances.  ​When officers are testifying in court they are not patrolling 
the community. Oftentimes traveling to courthouses warrants overtime pay, further 
spending communities’ budgets and officers’ time. County and municipal courts are often 
farther afield, less efficient, and sit at less convenient times.  Even when officers have 145
to show up, mayor’s court appearances are far less costly than the alternative. 
145 For examples of police officers spending much of their time in court, see Peter Moskos, ​Cop in the Hood 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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Together, these cost-saving measures further enhance the advantages of mayor’s courts. 
Convenience and flexibility, after all, are not just relevant considerations for defendants. 
Given the many problems that can arise in mayor’s courts, the benefits that accrue to the 
government alone may be insufficient to justify their operation. Court users, however, also 
receive significant benefits. 
Court User Benefits 
Mayor’s courts are touted as far more convenient, personal, and flexible than other court 
offerings. Here proponents often fall into the same trap as their counterparts in assuming that 
just because all courts have the opportunity to do something, all or even most will. Most of 
mayor’s courts’ potential benefits are discretionary, meaning that courts must act to create them. 
Here, the same discretion that enables the worst excesses detailed in Chapter 2 also enables 
the greatest value-add that mayor’s courts can offer. 
While mayor’s courts’ advantages are sometimes painted too broadly, the claims are not 
unfounded. On the contrary, at least some courts have demonstrated each of the following 
advantages. 
More Convenient 
Mayor's courts are more convenient than other courts. This underrated advantage can 
significantly reduce a case’s burden for its defendant. By reducing collateral consequences 
related to missing work, covering childcare, and finding a way to travel long distances to attend 
each court appearance, mayor’s courts’ convenience is a big advantage over municipal and 
county courts. 
Defendants can oftentimes pay out online or mail a check instead of ever entering the mayor’s 
court. Paying when convenient without having to make time to travel to or sit in a court makes 
the judicial process easier for defendants. While many courts offer payout options, few do so as 
extensively as mayor’s courts. 
Even when defendants have to appear in court, mayor’s courts are more convenient on two 
accounts. 
● Convenient Scheduling.  ​Mayor’s courts sit less frequently than municipal and county 
courts and can be more creative with their limited hours. Oftentimes that discretion leads 
to courts sitting in the evenings—or whenever the mayor feels is best for their 
community. 
● Proximity.​  Mayor’s courts exist within the communities they serve. Unlike county and 
municipal courts, which tend to serve larger populations, mayor’s courts are structurally 
closer to local users. While some courts are inconsequentially closer, others’ proximity 




Unlike most alleged benefits, which are frequently overstated, even proponents 
underestimate the convenience of mayor’s courts.  The chart below quantifies mayor’s 146
courts’ effect on Ohioans’ travel times to the nearest local court.  Currently, nearly 75% 147
of Ohioans live within 10 minutes of the nearest local court and 90% live within 15 
minutes. Without mayor’s courts, however, about 45% of Ohioans would live within 10 
minutes and only 70% would live within 15 minutes. That means that eliminating mayor’s 
courts would leave about 3.2 million fewer Ohioans within 10 minutes of their local court. 
 
Figure 10: Drive-time to Nearest Local Court 
Driving Time 









0-5 Minutes 3,212,362 27.84% 1,854,043 16.07% 
5-10 Minutes 5,254,601 45.55% 3,441,754 29.83% 
10-15 Minutes 1,990,573 17.25% 2,859,897 24.79% 
15-20 Minutes 646,177 5.60% 2,041,838 17.70% 
20-30 Minutes 374,269 3.24% 1,175,248 10.19% 
30-45 Minutes 70,559 0.61% 165,880 1.44% 
2010 Population  148 11,536,757 100.10% 11,536,757 100.02% 
 
Mayor’s courts are significantly more convenient than their counterparts, placing all but 1.1 
million Ohioans are within 15 minutes of the nearest local court. Without them, that number 
triples. Court systems should be accessible and eliminating convenient mayor’s courts is a step 
backward. Further, eliminating mayor’s courts would sacrifice their procedural benefits, too. 
Better Court Experiences 
Procedural justice—the sense of fairness that defendants have about the process of their case 
being adjudicated—can be a more important factor in determining defendant’s impressions of a 
146 While further analysis is important to refine our understanding of the travel-time implications of eliminating mayor’s 
courts, this geospatial analysis is, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to estimate the effect at all. 
147 I created drive-time rings that are 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-30, and 30-45 minutes away from each mayor’s, 
municipal, and county court. When the rings overlapped, I split them so users would go to the nearest court. 
 
I assigned census blocks (using 2010 U.S. Census Counts) to the ring that included the center point of that block. I 
then summed the population of the blocks assigned to each ring to estimate how many people lived in each ring for 
each court. By grouping rings by drive distance, I was able to calculate how many people lived within a certain driving 
distance of the nearest mayor’s, municipal, or county court. 
 
Repeating the analysis as if mayor’s courts did not exist produced a counterfactual of how long it would take Ohioans 
to drive to the nearest municipal or county court. 
148 Total percentages only sum to approximately 100% due to slight estimate imprecision. 
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court than even the outcome of their case.  Mayor’s courts routinely fall short on initial 149
impressions of fairness. 
Nonetheless, mayor’s courts ​can ​offer defendants better experiences than other 
courts—especially the municipal and county court alternatives. Three structural features of 
mayor’s courts create an environment ripe for greater court user satisfaction. While some 
factors are common among certain types of low-level courts, the combination of all three is not. 
● Homogenous Cases.​  Mayor’s courts can only hear a narrow range of cases, which 
means their cases are all similar and almost always simple. With a routine, steady 
workflow, mayor’s courts can specialize in handling the cases they hear the most. Those 
economies of scale allow them to best help lots of similarly situated defendants.  
● Lower Trialloads.​  Since mayor’s courts handle far fewer trials than their municipal or 
county court counterparts, they have more time to work with defendants on each case. 
With less pressure to churn through cases, they can afford to go slowly. 
● Heightened Emphasis on Personalization.​  By design, mayor’s courts offer personal 
interactions. Unlike other courts where raised benches and formal procedures can be the 
norm, mayor’s courts are less hierarchical and structured. When the presiding officer 
takes advantage of the personalization to connect with the defendant, make them feel 
heard, and better explain the court’s process, the system can be far more restorative 
than cookie-cutter trials elsewhere. 
While all mayor’s courts benefit from these advantages, discretionary factors are ultimately 
determinative. Procedural justice is the result of how courts treat people, and no structural 
factors can guarantee how people will treat each other. They can, however, make it easier (or 
harder) to treat people better. In busy courts struggling to maintain clearance rates, judges are 
hard pressed to find time to step back and explain processes and court staff are strained in 
ways that mayor’s court staffs are not. 
The Yellow Springs Mayor’s Court, for example, demonstrates the benefits of a more 
personalized experience. The mayor makes a point of following up with defendants with multiple 
offenses in the same year or those who fail to show proof of insurance when being charged to 
make sure that they are back on track. She also visits locations where incidents occured to 
better understand the case and advocate for new, clearer traffic signs when needed. Because of 
those benefits and because local fines tend to be lower than municipal fines, the Yellow Springs 
Village Council and its Justice System Task Force (which is comprised of concerned citizens) 
passed a resolution in October 2018 requiring that all cases eligible for the mayor’s court be 
filed there.  150
Court records also demonstrate defendants enjoying mayor’s courts’ greater flexibility. The 
Indian Hill Mayor’s Court, for example, frequently works with defendants to work court 
processes around their availability and means. Several examples of flexibility stand out from 
2017 cases. 
149 Sarah Bennett, Lorelei Hine, and Lorraine Mazerolle, “Procedural Justice,” ​Oxford Bibliographies​, April 26, 2018, 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0241.xml. 
150 Elise Burns, email message to author, January 14, 2019. 
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● In case 9-5-17, the defendant called the court to explain that she had no transportation 
to get there. The mayor granted her a continuance and the defendant agreed to pay out 
before the next court session. Similarly, the defendant in case 17C-20578 was granted a 
continuance because she had a meeting the same night as her initial court session. 
● The defendant in case 36-5-17 was charged with driving with expired tags. The mayor 
dismissed the case at the police officer’s request, because the defendant had obtained 
new Ohio plates. 
● The mayor granted the defendant’s request to continue case 43-1-17 until April. She 
wanted the delay because she was working during the February court and traveling for 
spring break during the March court. 
● The defendant in case 103-1-17 told the court he would be a few minutes late and the 
court extended deadlines to accommodate him. Likewise, the defendant in case 53-5-17 
called a few hours before court to explain that her flight was delayed, so she would not 
be in court. The mayor continued his case another month. 
● When the mayor ordered a capias with a $150 bond and a license forfeiture for a 
defendant failing to appear in court, the police officer on the case followed up personally. 
He called the defendant after the 1800 court session and left a voicemail allowing her to 
pay out the citation before 0900 the next day to avoid the warrant being served.  In 151
another case, a police officer realized he incorrectly told a defendant his court 
appearance was on July 18th, not July 16th. The officer then corrected his error in a 
voicemail at 2100 on July 5 and again on a call with the defendant that night at 2310.  152
These discretionary acts are hard to reconcile with common narratives of mayor’s courts being 
purely extortive. The challenge, then, is to empower mayor’s courts to offer these advantages 
while mitigating the risk that misguided officials use the same discretion for less noble 
purposes—either failing to treat defendants well or treating certain classes of defendants well 
and others poorly. While eliminating discretion eliminates the risk that it is abused, it also 
eliminates the opportunity for benevolent mayor’s courts to provide their users a better 
experience than they would have had at a county or municipal court. 
That said, the experiences of defendants in a single court may vary—such is the nature of 
personalized human interactions. For example, the Linndale Mayor’s Court magistrate George 
Sadd (before General Assembly passed a law discontinuing the court ) described his work in 
2013: “I go over their cases; I establish a little friendship with them. I find out what’s their 
concern and what the charges are against them. Often I reduce the charges against them and 
give them breaks and help them out as much as I can.”  The freedom to have trials as 153
“discussions” is difficult to replicate in busier, more structured municipal and county courts. 
Nonetheless, while some defendants note they appreciate Sadd’s kindness others describe him 
as “devious” and with “no respect for anyone.”  154
151 Indian Hill Mayor’s Court Incident report 25-17-03. 
152 Indian Hill Mayor’s Court Incident report 25-17-11. 





Those mixed reviews highlight the trouble of mayor’s courts personal advantages: they can be 
delivered inconsistently across courts and across cases. Given the risks, these procedural 
benefits are not justifications for maintaining the status quo, but rather an indication of the good 
mayor’s courts could do if reformed to better track discretionary outcomes and ensure that all 
mayor’s courts deliver for all their users. 
Not all alleged benefits of mayor’s courts, however, are nearly as considerable as they are 
chalked up to be. Most problematic, is the over-reliance on a faulty failsafe: the guaranteed right 
to de novo review. 
Faulty Failsafe: ​De Novo​ Review 
If a defendant wants a new trial for any reason, all she has to do is appeal within ten days of the 
initial trial and the case will be referred to the municipal or county court.  Once the case is 
155
transferred, it is legally as though the mayor’s court process never happened—the case starts 
afresh. Defenders of mayor’s courts argue that the right to appeal wipes out any problems with 
their work.  For example, a prominent pro-mayor’s court review naively describes the process 
156
as “if [defendants] are dissatisfied, they can simply start all over again at the municipal or county 
court level.”  157
Reality is not so simple. Rather, most defendants never realize the full promise of the right to 
appeal. The promise that a guaranteed retrial absolves mayor’s courts of any wrongs they may 
commit misses two key components of the right to appeal: 
● Limited Eligibility​.  While every defendant enters the mayor’s court with the right to 
appeal, few leave without waiving that right. Pleading guilty, paying out, or otherwise 
avoiding a trial sacrifices the right to appeal. For example, defendants who believes that 
the mayor who would preside over their trial would be too biased to adjudicate it fairly 
and plead no contest to make the issue go away also sacrifice their right to appeal. Only 
after losing a trial can a defendant actually enter the 10-day window to request a new 
trial. With roughly 0.5% of mayor’s court cases even reaching trial, hardly anyone makes 
it to the appeal window. 
● Costly Litigation​.  The new trial is not the fresh start it pretends to be. Even though 
mayor’s courts are often scheduled at convenient times, no day in court is free or without 
opportunity cost. Further, hearing a case in a municipal court carries costs (often higher 
than mayor’s court costs) and hassle, compounded by being the second court 
engagement in quick succession.  158
155 Jackie Borchardt, “What is a Mayor’s Court and How Can You Challenge its Decision? At Any (Court) Cost, 
Cleveland.com ​, November 29, 2016, 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/11/what_is_a_mayors_court_and_how.html. 
156 Justin Conley and Rebecca McKinsey, “Ohio’s Mayor’s Courts, Big Business,” ​The Columbus Dispatch​, July 22, 
2012, https://www.dispatch.com/article/20120722/NEWS/307229922. 
157 Paul Revelson, “Nothing But Trouble: The Ohio Legislature’s Failed Attempts to Abolish Mayor’s Courts,” 
University of Dayton Law Review ​35, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 223-246, 
https://udayton.edu/law/_resources/documents/law_review/nothing_but_trouble.pdf. 
158 In most cases, that is. Speedy trial statutes do not apply to municipal court cases appealed from a mayor’s court, 
so defendants have fewer assurances that their trial will be nearly as speedy as they might like and as they would 
have received if their case went straight to the municipal court. See Timothy E. Pierce, “Franklin County Criminal Law 
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Although the cost of a court appearance might be irrelevant for some defendants, that is 
not always the case. For some defendants, this second trial may mean taking a second 
day off work or further fees that they cannot afford. The significant burdens making it to 
court can carry—covering child care, finding transportation, and enduring heightened risk 
of losing one’s job among others—are redoubled when the process must be completed 
again soon after the initial day in a mayor’s court. 
While defendants wait for retrial, they may also have to cope with the consequences of 
the mayor’s court’s decision; for example many mayor’s courts suspend licenses, which 
disrupts defendants lives even if they win their appeal. Needing to get to work to earn 
money for legal fees or avoid getting fired puts defendants in a precarious position—do 
they risk driving despite their suspended license, skip work at the risk of getting fired, or 
try to find a more time-consuming, more expensive, mode of transportation that does not 
involve their driving? Thus, for the most vulnerable defendants, a guaranteed appeal is 
little consolation compared to the significant consequences a mayor’s court decision can 
have, even when it is overturned on appeal. 
Accounting for appeals from mayor’s courts is very difficult, because cases can also be 
transferred for many other reasons. While transfers are tracked and rare, data is not readily 
available to conclude just how many are appeals cases. For example, the Chagrin Falls Mayor’s 
Court has an unusually high transfer rate. At first that looks highly suspicious, but upon 
recognizing that it only processes waiverable citations, the high transfer rate makes perfect 
sense. Every case that cannot be paid out will automatically be transferred. The limited data 
sharing leads to a lack of individual context, which does mayor’s courts a major disservice. That 
said, the transfer data alone is sufficient to conclude that appeals uptake is low. Although 
unlikely, the lack of appeals could suggest widespread satisfaction. Regardless of its cause, the 
lack of appeals demonstrates that the right is not used as a failsafe nearly as frequently as 
many mayor’s court supporters would suggest.  
As society becomes more aware of the threats to justice and society that small claims courts 
can pose, mayor’s courts will fall under the microscope even more. With mayor’s courts 
preparing to face heightened scrutiny, proponents must make sure that they properly define the 
scope of mayor’s courts’ benefits just as much as critics must do the same with their critiques. 
Exaggerated accounts of benefits corrode productive discourse and needlessly stall reform 
efforts. 
Conclusion 
Even as the right to ​de novo​ review frequently fails to deliver on its promise, mayor’s courts do 
offer meaningful advantages. Granted greater convenience, more personalized justice, and 
heightened flexibility may sound like smoke and mirrors designed to mask quid-pro-quo 
arrangements, favoritism, and courts taking advantage of power dynamics. Nonetheless, the 
evidence from illustrative courts across the state suggest that at least some courts realize their 
lofty aspirations to the benefit of the members of the communities they serve. Is it really better to 




foreclose an entire realm of benefits just to reduce the risk that a few elites cannot get out of a 
speeding ticket? 
Since mayor’s courts offer meaningful benefits, abandoning them carries more costs than critics 
usually acknowledge. In addition to differentiating between structural problems and problems 
only with certain rogue actors (or classes of actors), and accurately accounting for the benefits 
mayor’s courts provide, policymakers must also consider the alternative to mayor’s courts. 
Low-level courts are notoriously flawed across the country—often times they are critiqued for 
the same issues that are said to plague mayor’s courts. Eradicating mayor’s courts will not 
necessarily solve many of the problems reformers might hope. In fact, it might further 





Making it Right: Recommended Repairs 
Mayor’s courts have been a feature of the Ohio judicial scene for more than 200 years. As the 
state and its people have changed, its mayor’s courts have evolved as well. Too many mayor’s 
courts, however, still fall short. As society’s knowledge about mayor’s courts grows, the 
environment they operate in shifts, and standards of justice evolve, court systems must change 
too. 
Current policy debates have forgotten the value of that maintenance. As reform conversations 
become hyperpolarized fights over the existence of mayor’s courts at large, they miss important 
reform opportunities. My own critical look at alleged problems created by and benefits flowing 
from mayor’s courts reveals a system in need of reform, not gridlock. No one expects perfection 
from our courts, thoroughly human institutions that they are. Rather, policymakers should seize 
opportunities to improve the system, even if one change alone is not a panacea. 
The current mayor’s court system needs improvement, but it should not be eliminated. Three 
main drawbacks to blanket eliminations make it an unwise policy, even if it was politically viable. 
● Lose Mayor’s Court Advantages.​  All mayor’s courts have a theoretical capacity to 
provide benefits that other courts do not. More importantly, there is clear evidence that 
some courts deliver on that potential. While many local politicians fight to keep mayor’s 
courts for the money they provide, their arguments about benefits their courts provide 
users can be sound. Those benefits should only be sacrificed if absolutely necessary. 
● Experience Imperfect Alternatives.​  Since some of the problems in mayor’s courts—for 
example discriminatory outcomes—are, to some extent, problems in nearly all U.S. 
courts, eliminating mayor’s courts will not eradicate the problem.  
● Incur Transaction Costs.  ​Shifting several hundred thousands of cases from mayor’s 
courts to municipal and county courts would be a major undertaking. Even if the ban 
allowed mayor’s courts to finish their cases for a year and only transfer those that are 
outstanding at the end of the transition period, the case surge would be a strain on 
already stressed county and municipal courts. 
Mayor’s courts are notoriously bad at keeping records, which further compounds the 
challenges of mass-transfers. Record incompatibility between mayor’s court and 
receiving courts’ systems, missing records, and other communication disconnects will 
hurt both defendants and enforcement initiatives. Even though the ban on mayor’s 
courts in communities with fewer than 200 residents only affected a few courts, it still 
created significant transaction costs. The Brice Mayor’s Court, for example, merely 
posted a sign on the door that once led to the mayor’s court instructing defendants to go 
to the Franklin County Municipal Court to access case files.  When Cheryl, a defendant 159




cited for driving under suspension just before the Brice Mayor’s Court closed, followed 
up with her presumably transferred case, the Franklin County Municipal Clerk’s office 
told her that it had not received her files.  Days later Cheryl’s records and those for 160
other missing cases were delivered and she was finally able to get her case added to the 
docket in the municipal court. All that hassle just to get in line to wait more. A bulk 
transfer from all mayor’s courts would only be worse than the pain created by a small 
number of courts transferring. 
Further adjusting population thresholds to eliminate mayor’s courts in certain communities is a 
short-term solution at best. That piecemeal approach does well to eliminate specific classes of 
courts. Since the most significant remaining problems with mayor’s court affect all types of 
mayor’s courts, there are no suspect classes to eliminate. The political capital required to 
eliminate any number of mayor’s courts would be better spent on a more tailored solution. 
A natural, but misguided alternative to eliminating mayor’s courts wholesale is to replace them 
with a different type of local court. Community courts are the most promising substitute, but they 
are not a wise replacement. 
Many states have recently devolved adjudication back to communities that once hosted mayor's 
courts. These so called “community courts” are touted as keys to better justice outcomes for 
countless low-level offenders. Their flexible, personalized touch promises to provide better 
senses of procedural justice alongside more restorative outcomes. With decisions made close 
to the community of those affected, the community courts hope to increase buy-in from locals 
and stay responsive to local customs and values.  161
Facially, community courts offer three primary advantages over mayor’s courts. 
● Commitment to Data Transparency.​  Mayor’s courts are required to report limited data to 
the Ohio Supreme Court each quarter. Despite the negligible scope of the requirement, 
some courts still fail to satisfy it. Many courts are hamstrung by their records software, 
denying them access to meaningful data analytics even if they wanted it. Community 
courts, on the other hand, are born from data-based decision making and routinely share 
that data with the communities they serve.  That data allows courts to make informed 162
decisions to best deliver justice and helps their communities be confident that the court 
is working effectively and fairly. Unlike mayor’s courts where ineffectiveness, abuse, and 
exploitation may never be discovered, in a transparent and data-rich environment like 
community courts, those shortcomings would be revealed in short order. 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Papers/2015/PendyWhat%20If-Is
sues%20in%20Assuming%20Mayors%20Court%20Jurisdiction.ashx​. 
160 Name changed. 
161 In an attempt to find a more convenient and less stigmatized environment, some community courts are even 
leaving the courtroom. The Spokane, Washington mayor’s court, for example, is held in a library community room. 
The presiding judge there supported the unorthodox location because “the folks we were focusing on have been 
coming in and out of the system for years, and we wanted to let them know we were approaching this in a new way.” 
That sort of choice, while seemingly novel, actually mirrors mayor’s courts, many of which are held in community 
buildings.See “Downtown Library Welcomes Spokane Community Court with Open Arms,” ​Center for Court 
Innovation ​, December 28, 2017, 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/articles/downtown-library-welcomes-spokane-community-court-open-arms. 




● Meaningful Community Oversight.​  Voters electing their mayor is often the full extent of 
citizens’ oversight over their court. The absence of oversight allows mayor’s courts to 
operate with impunity—much of what they do will never be detected and, if it is, no 
formal recourse awaits. Community courts, conversely are often integrated into the 
community from the outset with the community leveraging focus groups and surveys to 
best set up the court and then ensure its actions meet the ongoing needs of the 
community’s residents. 
● Restorative Sanctions.​  While mayor’s courts can sentence defendants to jail, community 
service, or other consequences, the vast majority of cases result in the defendant being 
fined. The community court model is somewhat different. Instead of using fines to punish 
behavior, it leverages threat of jail and connections with social service providers to 
induce defendants to commit to restorative activities like addressing drug addiction or 
anger control issues.  Community courts tend to have more touchpoints with 163
defendants within a given case than mayor’s courts do. 
Policymakers would be wise to learn from community courts’ successes, especially in their use 
of data analytics. Ultimately, however, community courts fall short of being a worthwhile 
replacement. Despite being the remedy du jour to balance personalization and fairness in 
low-level courts, community courts are a poor fit to replace Ohio's mayor’s courts for two 
primary reasons. 
● Heightened Financial Conflict.  ​Community courts are more vulnerable to private 
influence than mayor’s courts and can face similar financial pressures to mayor’s courts. 
Despite the hype, community courts fail to resolve the most pressing issue with mayor’s 
courts and no amount of community oversight can compete with the pressure to keep a 
community solvent.  164
● Incompatible Histories.  ​Community courts often represent a new system filling the 
longstanding vacuum that in some cases has been present since mayor’s courts were 
eradicated decades ago. Being new, community courts have been designed with the 
benefit of decades of procedural justice, data analytics, and effective oversight research 
that did not exist when mayor’s courts were created. 
The new community courts are modern actors designed for the present context with the 
benefit of the best thinking on how to produce just outcomes that heal society. They offer 
lessons for mayor’s courts to learn, but the history of communities’ experience with 
mayor’s courts suggest that directly importing community courts is unwise. While 
community courts fill a service vacuum in other states, in Ohio they would compete with 
or replace longstanding mayor’s court infrastructure, processes, and norms. Large, 
decentralized, sprawling bureaucracies cannot be swapped out like lightbulbs. 
163 Eric Lee, “Community Courts: An Evolving Model,” ​Community Justice Series​ (no. 2), October 2000, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/183452.pdf. 
164 Michael Zuckerman, “The Experience of Dignity: Community Courts and the Future of the Criminal Justice 




Trendiness alone does not make community courts the right choice for Ohio. Other near-peer 
courts, however, would be even worse. The following near-peer arrangements currently used by 
other states have their own deep flaws that preclude their being suitable replacements. 
● Summary Courts.  ​Summary courts have much in common with mayor’s courts: arresting 
officers often act as prosecutors, defense attorneys are rare, and judges do not need a 
law degree (although unlike mayor’s courts, they must have at least a baccalaureate 
degree).  Common in South Carolina, the summary court model is higher-stakes than 165
mayor’s courts, frequently hustling defendants through court and straight to jail.  166
Whereas many traffic offenses are decriminalized in Ohio (making them exclusively civil 
matters), they still constitute criminal acts in South Carolina, giving summary courts even 
more leverage over vulnerable citizens.  Since summary courts resolve few of the 167
issues with mayor’s courts while introducing several more problems, they would be a 
poor replacement for mayor’s courts. 
● Justice Courts.  ​Justice courts are notorious in New York for many of the same reasons 
that mayor’s courts are. Like mayor’s courts, the 1,250 some odd justice courts handle 
traffic offenses and small claims and are run by justices who need no prior education. 
While justice courts are subject to slightly more active oversight than mayor’s courts 
are—an average of 40 justices have been reprimanded or removed each year over the 
past three decades—they also handle more significant cases including those with 
multi-year jail sentences and domestic violence cases.  Justice courts suffer from the 168
same influence of money as mayor’s courts—the New York network collects over $200 
million in fines and fees annually—and carry a far darker reputation for abusive justices.
 Justice courts are hardly an improvement over Ohio’s current system. 169
● Magistrate Courts.​  Ohio eliminated its magistrate courts, which are also known as police 
courts, nearly 150 years ago. Their former role is now played by municipal and county 
courts, which are basically more structured, better regulated magistrate courts. While 
some magistrate courts do not require judges to have legal training and they generally 
tend to handle low-level cases like mayor’s courts, they are a poor fit for how the Ohio 
judicial system has evolved since they were last a part of it.  They would overlap too 170
much with municipal and county courts. 
Above all, replacing mayor’s courts directly leaves their biggest problem unresolved: money’s 
perverse influence. Justice ought not be a fundraising exercise. When the two are allowed to 
mix, however, money’s corrupting influence is hard to deflect. To lift the cloud of impropriety 
from Ohio’s mayor’s courts, they must be divorced from revenue-generating schemes. The 
165 Diane DePietropaolo Price, et. al., “Summary Injustice: A Look at Constitutional Deficiencies in South Carolina’s 
Summary Courts,” ​National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers​, 2016, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/summaryinjustice2016_nacdl_aclu.pdf ​. 
166 The average hearing time in South Carolina summary courts is about 3.29 minutes—a number skewed high by a 
few outlier hearings. See Alisa Smith, et. al., “Rush to Judgement: How South Carolina’s Summary Courts Fail to 
Protect Constitutional Rights, ​National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers​, 2017, 
https://www.nacdl.org/RushToJudgement/. 
167 Ibid. 
168 William Glaberson, “In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power,” ​The New York Times​, September 25, 
2006, ​https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html​. 
169 Granted if mayor’s courts were subject to comparable oversight, there might be evidence of a comparable number 
of abusive judges too. Nonetheless, the many stories of exploitation, racism, and abuse are deeply troubling. 
170 “Magistrates’ Court,” ​Encyclopaedia Britannica​, ​https://www.britannica.com/topic/magistrates-court​. 
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mayor in ​Tumey​ was believed to be influenced by money since he personally was paid extra 
only when convicting defendants. Today, police departments and communities depend on 
judicial fundraising to remain solvent. Even if no single case is resolved based on a financial 
decision, the broader environment that produced and resolved that case was built with a strong 
pressure to preserve revenue flows. The most noble public servant may overcome these 
temptations, but a system that depends on personal greatness cannot endure.  Those officials 171
who withstand the pressure to sacrifice justice for funding still face unshakeable perceptions of 
impropriety. 
Five General Reforms 
By pursuing five general types of reforms, Ohio can significantly improve its mayor’s courts. 
● Divorce Fundraising and Justice.​  Too much of the misbehavior in mayor’s courts (and 
many other courts) can be traced to money's influence. Fundraising and justice are two 
fundamentally conflicting pursuits: acquitting when appropriate advances justice and 
harms fundraising efforts. The pressure to boost revenue is far more pervasive than the 
trial-level conflicts most court cases have worried about. Mayor’s courts’ potential to 
produce funding streams, which in turn keep communities solvent, weighs on all court 
actors from the legislature to police department leadership. It encourages policing 
resources to focus on traffic offenses instead of responding to residents’ calls. Since so 
few cases go to trial, judge-based conflict of interest is a miniscule fragment of money’s 
conflict-inducing reach. 
An ideal system would fully eliminate financial pressures from judicial actors. Since small 
communities and their police departments need to get funded in some way, it is 
impractical to prevent fines and fees from ever reaching community coffers. Rather, 
policymakers should attenuate the connection between money from a case and its end 
user. Right now, every fine paid goes largely to the community that compelled it. By 
having court fines instead go to a centralized repository to then be redistributed to 
communities based on population, much of the incentive to produce large numbers of 
high-revenue cases disappears. Communities can retain their lifeline of funding, but it 
will be far less of a factor when making court-related decisions. Halving a mayor’s court’s 
caseload because the police department is focusing on less profitable concerns will no 
longer halve a large portion of that community’s budget. 
● Raise Education Requirements.​  Mayor’s court trials should be required to be run by a 
lawyer.  Allowing a mayor without a legal education to adjudicate trials is a necessary 172
evil where lawyers are prohibitively rare. It once made sense for Ohio to allow that 
flexibility to resolve low-level disputes without making the relevant parties travel long 
distances to appear before a trained judge. Now reaching county and municipal courts is 
easier and lawyers are far more prevalent. In fact, many mayor’s courts employ a lawyer 
as a prosecutor. When the only lawyer in the room is arguing one side of a case, the 
171 After all, governance systems are only necessary because people are liable to fall short of those angelic ideals. 
James Madison, “The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the 
Different Departments,” ​Federalist No. 51​, February 8, 1788. 
172 At the very least, those communities that employ a lawyer as the prosecutor in their mayor’s court should be 
required to also employ a lawyer as judge. The ability to find a lawyer to fill the prosecutorial role is a strong indication 
that there are plenty of lawyers about. 
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less-well-trained judge is in a dangerous position. Likewise when a wealthy defendant 
utilizes the high-powered, private DUI defense bar in a court where the presiding judge 
has no legal background. 
● Standardize Record-Keeping​.  Mayor’s courts rely on inconsistent and often flawed data 
systems. While some courts deftly use their system, many others suffer devastating 
record deletions, use handwritten records, or otherwise utilize unnecessarily risky 
record-keeping processes. By centralizing the record keeping process management, 
courts can benefit from collective negotiating power with private vendors and the shared 
knowledge created by a wide user base. Further, the standardization will help court 
users interact with case management systems more smoothly and researchers 
understand courts’ behavior more fully. 
● Increase Transparency​.  The public deserves access to more information about what 
happens in mayor’s courts that touch so many lives each year. Mayor’s courts casual 
approach to justice can give defendants the mistaken impression that the stakes do not 
warrant a rigorous defense or fair treatment—there is a reason why so many challenges 
to mayor’s courts are brought by lawyers. With recording technology more accessible 
than ever, mayor’s courts should record their proceedings—and make them available to 
the public—even if they do not go so far as to become full courts of record.  Any record 173
of what happened allows defendants to review their experience, show it to others if they 
worry they were treated unfairly, and provide stronger evidence of abuse in challenges to 
the ways that mayor’s courts operate.  Transparency increases accountability. Even if 174
no one ever watches the recordings, being recorded and the threat that someone could 
watch the recordings will check the worst excesses of abusive courts. 
● Bolster Oversight​.  Even when evidence of mayor’s courts misbehaving emerges, little 
comes of that information. Overseeing mayor’s courts slips between the state Supreme 
Court and local prosecutors with neither picking up the oversight burden. Local 
prosecutors are often too close to the mayor’s courts they are supposed to oversee, 
which makes it unnecessarily difficult for them to be a meaningful watchdog. 
Transparency alone allows the public, researchers, and other concerned parties to offer 
a degree of oversight. Institutional oversight, however, is far more effective because it is 
a more direct check on mayor’s courts. Under the new model, rogue courts would not 
only face public outrage, but also quick sanction from the Ohio state government. While 
any oversight body is a major and worthwhile improvement, empowering the Ohio 
Supreme Court to oversee mayor’s courts—as it does all other Ohio courts—makes the 
173 For a discussion of how courts can successfully leverage falling recording costs, see Jan McMillan and Lee 
Suskin, “Digital Court Recording Makes the Record Effectively,” ​Trends in State Courts​, 2015, 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202015/DigitalCourtRecording_McMillan_Suskin.ashx​. 
174 Keeping more extensive records and making them more accessible creates a risk that those records haunt 
defendants later in life, even long after their case is resolved. A high schooler charged with driving under the 
influence and drinking underage, for example, may currently arrange a deal to plead to lesser charges, pay a large 
fine, and complete community service hours. That child’s night of egregious errors will have virtually no effect on 
college plans, career aspirations, or anything else more than a few months beyond the incident. That situation would 
be far less likely with more extensive and pervasive transparency. Those who favor the current capacity to make 
cases disappear will likely resist attempts to increase transparency. If needed, those concerns could be allayed by a 
compromise that allows defendants opportunities to restrict access to their records. Already local media coverage 
and even police department Facebook pages publicize incident reports without undermining societal stability. See 




most sense. The current oversight regime is so meek that even partial oversight from the 
Supreme Court would be significantly more robust. 
These reforms will likely have many opponents—change often seems daunting. To maximize 
fairness and justice while still enjoying the benefits of delegating broad discretion to local courts, 
policymakers must be willing to spend political capital on compromises to improve the current 
system. While all five reform axis are important, movement along even one is a step in the right 





By trading oft-parroted assumptions about mayor’s courts for hard facts about how they all 
actually operate, policymakers can make more informed policy. Mayor’s courts cause more 
problems than they should, but not as universally as some allege. They also offer more benefits 
than they get credit for, but not as many as they could. Those realities mean the system needs 
to be reformed, not eliminated or replaced. Even if elimination was politically viable, it would 
sacrifice meaningful benefits merely to trade some problems for others. 
No matter how bad a single mayor’s court is, others may add immense value to their 
communities by administering justice with discretion, fairness, and humility. The worst excesses, 
however, demand an answer. Right now the lack of transparency and oversight allows mayor’s 
courts to exploit defendants without the public being any wiser. 
Delegating power to local governments has been successful for Ohio in many situations. 
Problems with some—or even many—mayor’s courts are insufficient to abandon that approach. 
Instead, policymakers should tweak the environment to help all mayor’s courts deliver on their 
promises. Severely curtailing the role of money in judicial processes, better equipping mayor’s 
court staffs to succeed, and bolstering transparency and oversight to limit the damage done by 
rogue courts will hold mayor’s courts more accountable and restore faith in a much maligned 
system. 
 
